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ABSTRACT 
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his followers established a complicated and 
paradoxical government that combined an authoritative, 
theocratic government with democratic underpinnings.  
Although the structure of the government has remained 
relatively unchanged for almost three decades, the 
government’s bureaucracy and policies have experienced an 
ongoing evolutionary process that has given rise to three 
distinct shifts with radicals, reformists, and conservative 
hard-liners taking turns steering the country and pressing 
different agendas.  These three shifts present an 
interesting puzzle: given the strict authoritative nature of 
Iran’s theocratic government, what is causing these 
behavior, policy, and agenda shifts?   
    This thesis uses three analytical lenses to examine the 
causes of behavioral shifts since the 1979 Iranian 
revolution:  1979-1989, the Khomeini era; 1989-2004, the 
reformists; and 2004-present, the conservative hard liners.  
Each lens investigates a different cause of the shifts; a) 
civil society, b) bureaucratic politics, and c) 
international politics.  The goal of this thesis is to 
better understand what is driving Iran’s politics and 
governance and why.   
A thorough analysis using our three analytical lenses 
will provide a three dimensional perspective of the driving 
factor behind Iran’s governmental politics.  Our analytic 
method can also be used to analyze the governmental politics 
of other countries, and serve as a foundation for 
establishing effective foreign policy.  Often, it seems 
 vi
foreign policy is formulated based upon a one dimensional 
view.  All three lenses together provide a more 
comprehensive approach to understanding how governments 
react to internal and external pressures.  It is important 
to understand the causes of governmental behavior in order 
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A seemingly imminent confrontation with Iran appeared 
on the horizon when President Bush included Iran in his 
January, 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech.1  Whether or not an 
actual confrontation will occur between the United States 
and Iran is yet to be seen.  However, U.S. and international 
attention on Iran remains high and there is much debate over 
who hold political power in Iran and who makes its policy 
decisions.   
In general, many think of Iran’s government as a 
renegade, authoritarian, and static system; in reality 
Iran’s government is evolving and changing in reaction to 
various internal and external circumstances.  Our thesis 
explores several different sources that drive the inter-
workings and motivations of Iran’s government.  The goal in 
looking at different sources is to better understand the 
process that drives change within Iran’s policies and to 
investigate who in Iran holds power for change and why. 
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his followers established a complicated and 
paradoxical government that combined an authoritative, 
theocratic government with democratic underpinnings.  
Although the structure of the government has remained 
relatively unchanged for almost three decades, the 
government’s bureaucracy and policies have experienced an 
ongoing evolutionary process that has given rise to three 
                     
1  “Bush Takes on the ‘Axis of Evil’,” The Economist, Global Agenda, 
http://www.lexis-nexis.com, (accessed on August 27, 2007). 
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distinct shifts with radicals, reformists, and conservative 
hard-liners taking turns steering the country and pressing 
different agendas.  The very nature of authoritative and 
theocratic rule tends to stifle governmental evolution and 
change.  Therefore, these three shifts present an 
interesting puzzle: given the strict authoritative nature of 
Iran’s theocratic government, what is causing these 
behavior, policy, and agenda shifts?   
This thesis uses three analytical lenses to examine the 
causes of behavioral shifts during three time periods since 
the 1979 Iranian revolution:  1979-1989, the Khomeini era; 
1989-2004, the reformists; and 2004-present, the 
conservative hardliners.  Each lens functions as a filter, 
which allows us to analyze three distinct focal points for 
the cause(s) of these shifts: a) civil society, b) 
bureaucratic politics, and c) international politics.  Each 
lens yields valuable information from its particular vantage 
point.  However, overlaying the analysis of all three lenses 
creates a synergistic effect, which reveals a three-
dimensional array of change-inducing stimuli that affect 
Iran’s behavior.  Only by considering all three lenses, and 
not just one, can we better understand the complicated 
process that drives Iran’s behavior and possible ways that 
the U.S. government can influence change in Iran’s politics.    
Our thesis is organized into the following seven 
chapters: 
Chapter I provides a brief overview of our thesis and 
the puzzle we seek to solve through our study:  if Iran’s 
government is authoritarian and theocratic, what is causing 
these behavior and agenda shifts? 
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 Chapter II provides a post-revolutionary timeline of 
major domestic and international incidents in Iran’s 
history.  Chapter II also provides an outline of Iran’s 
governmental structure, which provides a baseline for 
understanding the interworkings of Iran’s government. 
Chapter III offers three analytic lenses for analyzing 
Iran’s political evolution-- civil society, bureaucratic 
politics, and international politics—in order to examine the 
causes of the Iranian government’s behavioral shifts.  These 
lenses provide three distinct focal points that we apply to 
each of the three time periods.  Together, these three 
lenses construct the analytical framework of this thesis. 
Chapter IV investigates the Khomeini Years (1978-1989), 
examining the societal, political, and international factors 
that influenced the government during this period and 
leading to the reformist shift following Khomeini’s death.  
Chapter V looks at the Reformist Years (1989-2003), 
examining the societal, political, and international factors 
that influenced the government during this period and 
leading to the hard-line conservatism shift ushered in by 
Ahmadinejad’s election.   
Chapter VI offers insights into the Hard-Line 
Conservative Years (2004-Present), which looks at the 
societal, political, and international factors that have 
influenced the government thus far in this ongoing period.     
And Chapter VII offers concluding remarks, summarizing:  
our examination of the three time periods investigated.  It 
also provides insight into the primary drivers of change as 
observed through our analysis. 
In addition to analyzing the Iranian government’s 
ongoing evolution, this thesis provides a framework that can 
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be used to examine other countries.  This framework provides 
a multidimensional approach to analyzing the driving factors 
of political change over time.  
Ultimately, our analysis reveals that the impetus for 
change in Iran’s governmental behavior comes from within.  
Although tremendous potential to affect change resides 
within the civil society arena, that potential for change is 
marginalized by the bureaucratic arena when international 
pressure is applied.  This interesting dynamic illustrates 
the need to fully understand the driving factors of a 
governments behavior from a three dimensional perspective, 





II. POST-REVOLUTIONARY TIMELINE AND GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers a brief overview of Iran’s history 
since the 1979 revolution.  The chapter is divided into 
three distinct periods, the Khomeini Years, the Reformist 
Years, and the Hard-line Conservatism Years, and gives a 
baseline of the post-revolutionary governmental structure.  
This chapter demonstrates that, while the structure of 
Iran’s government has remained largely the same since the 
time of the revolution, there have been significant 
variances in Iran’s governmental behavior.  We seek to 
understand the degree to which the civil society, 
bureaucratic politics, and the international arena have 
affected or caused these variances.  
B. KHOMEINI YEARS 
The Khomeini era began with the lead-up to Iran’s 1979 
revolution, and is punctuated by four main events that 
significantly affected the development of Iran’s new 
government; the 1979 revolution, the 1979-81 hostage crisis, 
the establishment of Iran as an Islamic Republic, and the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.   
Almost immediately following the revolution, the 
takeover of the U.S. embassy by Iranian students and 
subsequent hostage crisis threw Iran into a state of 
international isolation.  Iran was labeled an outlaw state 
by the U.S., and had few allies on which to rely.  The 
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effects of isolation coupled with the outbreak of the Iran-
Iraq War in 1980 had significant impact on internal 
political wrangling that shaped Iran’s transformation into a 
theocratic Islamic republic. 
  
 
The 1979 Islamic revolution, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, transitioned Iran from a monarchy to a theocratic 
based government.  This post-revolutionary government was 
based on Khomeini’s interpretation of Shi’ite Islam Velayet-
e-faqih), which established a Supreme Leader as the head of 
government. (see Figure 1). 
Khomeini believed that in a true Islamic state, 
individuals holding government posts should have knowledge 
of Sharia law (Islamic law), and the country's ruler should 
Figure 1: Iran’s Government Structure 
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be a faqih, someone whose knowledge of Islamic law and 
justice was superior to that of others.2  
Iran's political system is a complex mix of Islamic 
theocracy and democracy.  The Supreme Leader, who is 
appointed by the Iranian electorate, heads the system.  Like 
western societies, the Iranian government has three separate 
branches of government, the executive, judicial, and 
legislative branches.  According to the Constitution, the 
Supreme Leader is the overseer of general policies within 
the Islamic Republic; he establishes the vectors for both 
domestic and foreign policies.  The Supreme Leader also 
serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and 
controls intelligence and security operations.  He can 
declare war or peace, and maintains the power to appoint and 
dismiss the leaders of the judiciary, and the supreme 
commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard.  This is the 
highest appellate authority within the government.3   
The constitution defines the office of “President” as 
the second highest state authority, inferior only to the 
Supreme Leader.  The President is charged with implementing 
the laws defined in the Constitution and exercising 
executive powers.  The President also coordinates government 
decisions, and selects government policies for review by the 
legislative branch.   
                     
 2  Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003).   
 3  Frontline, “The Structures of Power in Iran,” Frontline, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html 
(accessed on June 10, 2008). 
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The legislative branch of the government is comprised 
of three components--Parliament, the Guardian Council, and 
the Expediency Council.  Parliament is responsible for 
drafting legislation, ratifying international treaties, and 
approving the national budget.  
The constitution instituted a 12 member Council of 
Guardians, six Islamic clergyman and six lay members, who 
are charge with validating whether laws are consistent with 
Islamic law and the constitution(6 are selected by the 
Supreme Leader and 6  selected by the Judiciary).4  This 
council plays a pivotal role in ensuring “clerical rule”.  
They are responsible for vetting those candidates running 
from public office and accepting only those who support a 
theocratic state.5  The Council of Guardians approves all 
legislation. This is the second highest appellate authority 
within the government. 
The legislative branch consists of a 270-seat 
unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Parliament, 
empowered to dismiss cabinet ministers by no-confidence 
votes and has the ability to impeach the president for 
misconduct in office.6 
The Expediency Council is the policy-making body of the 
government with some legislative powers.  It is comprised of 
prominent religious, social, and political figures.  The 
                     
 4  Anthony H. Cordesman, and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas and Dual 
Containment (Colorado: West View Press, 1997).   
 5  Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and 
Transformation in Iran (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).  
 6  Ibid. 
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council serves as a mediatory between Parliament and the 
Council of Guardians, and as a consultative council to the 
Supreme Leader.  
The judiciary branch is similar to the U.S. judiciary 
system in that it is comprised of several courts that try 
civil, criminal, and national security cases.  The Special 
Clerical Court handles crimes committed by members of 
clergy.  It functions separately from the rest of the 
judicial branch and answers only to the Supreme Leader.  The 
Supreme Leader appoints the head of the Judiciary.7 
The Assembly of Experts is a body of 96 clerics, 
charged with appointing, overseeing, and if necessary has 
the power to dismiss the Supreme Leader.  
At face value, the Iranian governmental system appears 
to be a marriage between democratic and theocratic systems.  
However, given the built-in system of religious and 
theocratic controls, democracy does not function fully.  
Using the above description as our baseline, we will 
evaluate the changes and shifts in the balance of powers, 
ideologies, and agendas during our three evolutionary 
periods.   
The revolution threw Iran into a state of international 
isolation and deepened its wedge of economic strife.  Iran’s 
problems continued with the 1979 hostage crises which 
resulted in the freezing of Iranian assets, U.S. embargos, 
                     
 7  Maureen Hoch, “Governing Iran,” Online News Hour, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iran/structure.
html (accessed on June 1, 2008). 
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and sanctions.8  The hostage crisis sent an already failing 
economy into a continued downward spiral.   
The eight year Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) stifled Iran’s 
economic progress, and had a significant cost in terms of 
casualties.9  Nearly one million Iranians were maimed or 
killed during the war; conversely Iran also had a soaring 
birth rate due to Khomeini’s proclamations against birth 
control.10  The combination high war casualties among Iran’s 
adult population and high birth rates, created a tidal wave 
of young Iranians, which would have significant consequences 
to Iran’s economy and politics.  The war also greatly 
facilitated implementation of Khomeini’s political agenda 
and vision of Islamic rule.    
From the beginning of Khomeini’s reign until the time 
of his death, his regime faced obstacles which precluded the 
government from achieving the initial goals of the 
revolution and satisfying the needs and demands of the 
Iranian populace.  Khomeini’s vision of an ideal and united 
Islamic community, therefore, was never fully realized.  
Iran was left in the hands of those with more political than 
religious credentials, and leaders looking for economic 
reform, improved international relations, and the separation 
of religion and politics.11  
                     
 8  Cordesman and Hashim, p. 9.   
9  Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the 
Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 150. 
10  Gheissari and Nasr, p. 150. 
 11  Ibid. 
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C. REFORMIST YEARS 
The reformist years began with the new Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Khamenei, and President Rafsanjani.  This time 
period was punctuated by heightened bureaucratic infighting, 
efforts to implement economic reform, internal movements for 
greater civil rights, expanded freedom of the press, and 
efforts to improve international relations. 
The reformists inherited an internationally isolated, 
economically troubled, and internally divided country.12  
President Rafsanjani, despite being an ardent follower of 
Khomeini, recognized the need for less radical influences 
within government, economic reform, and improved relations 
with the west.   
With Khamenei’s tacit approval, Rafsanjani implemented 
strategies designed to dilute the influence of radical 
clerics, in an attempt to edge them out of positions of 
power within the executive and bureaucratic branches of 
government.13  He also implemented economic reforms which 
improved socioeconomic conditions, but had an unintended 
side effect of enriching Iran’s ruling cleric elites. 
In 1997, President Khatami was elected by an 
overwhelming majority of Iranian voters.  His “civil 
society” campaign platform promised governmental and social 
reforms that appealed to Iran’s tidal wave of maturing 
youth.  Despite staunch opposition from Iran’s ruling 
clerics, Khatami was successful in achieving some of his 
                     
12  Shireen T. Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, (New York, Westport and 
London: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 1-5. 
13  Cordesman and Hashim, p. 28.   
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reform agenda.  In addition to internal reforms, Khatami 
also pursued improved relations on the international stage 
through his “Dialog among Civilizations” initiative.14  
Despite slowly improving domestic conditions, the 
reformists became mired in the global environment following 
the events of September 11, 2001.  The reformist movement 
began its decline following President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” 
speech in 2002.15  Conservatives, mostly hardliners, saw 
U.S. aggression as an opportunity to discredit the 
reformists, and roll back many civil liberties, clamp down 
on the press, and prohibit public demonstrations.     
D. HARD-LINE CONSERVATIVE YEARS 
The hard-line conservative years began with a new 
generation of politicians sweeping aside the reformists in 
the 2004 parliamentary elections.  The hardliners believe 
that the goals of the revolution were not fully realized 
under the previous all-cleric and reformist periods.16  
Hardliners introduced a new version of reform that shifts 
focus away from civil liberties, and promises a stronger, 
more unified government improved socioeconomic conditions. 
 
 
                     
14  Stephen C. Poulson, Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran, 
(Oxford: Lexington Books, 2005), p. 257. 
15  Poulson, p. 264.  
16  Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran’s Old Guard Pushed Aside,” Washington Post 
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/10/AR2008021002698.
html (accessed on February 12, 2008). 
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The 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad solidified 
the hard-liner takeover of the bureaucratic institutions of 
government, with the goals of establishing Iran as one of 
the world’s leading nations.17   
Since 2004, Ahmadinejad and the hard-line conservatives 
have embarked on a campaign of domestic civil and cultural 
suppression and international antagonism.  Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear technology and Ahmadinejad’s defiance of 
international pressure has led to heightened international 
scrutiny and increased domestic nationalism. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a brief overview of significant 
governmental, domestic, and international events that are 
associated with three distinct time periods since Iran’s 
revolution.  The next chapter establishes the analytical 
framework with which we will investigate the causes of these 








                     
17  Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran’s Old Guard Pushed Aside,” Washington Post 
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/10/AR2008021002698.
html (accessed on February 12, 2008). 
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III. THREE ANALYTIC LENSES FOR ANALYZING IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his followers established a complicated and 
paradoxical government that combined an authoritative, 
theocratic government with strong democratic underpinnings.  
Although the structure of the government has remained 
relatively unchanged for almost three decades, the 
government’s bureaucracy and policies have experienced an 
ongoing evolutionary process that has given rise to three 
distinct shifts with radicals, reformists, and conservative 
hard-liners taking turns steering the country and pressing 
different agendas.  These three shifts present and 
interesting puzzle: if Iran’s government is authoritarian 
and theocratic, what is causing these behavior and or agenda 
shifts? 
This chapter constructs three analytical lenses to 
examine the causes of the Iranian government’s behavioral 
shifts in three time periods since the 1979 Iranian 
revolution:  1979-1989, the Khomeini era; 1989-2004, the 
reformists; and 2004-present, the time of the conservative 
hard liners .  Each lens investigates a different cause of 
these shifts; a) civil society, b) bureaucratic politics, 
and c) international politics.  The goal of using these 
three lenses is to better understand what is driving Iran’s 
politics and governance and why. 
 16
B. CIVIL SOCIETY LENS 
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed, — That 
whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these 
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
it.”18  This excerpt from the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence eloquently describes the role of civil society 
in the establishment and behavior of government.  The 
assertion that civil society has sway over governmental 
behavior is strengthened by two distinct theories; Social 
Contract Theory, which describes the relationship between 
the government and the governed, including the inherent 
promises, duties and limitations of each, and Social 
Movement Theory (SMT), which describes how groups within 
society can organize to challenge the government, especially 
pertaining to issues and conditions that are perceived to 
violate the social contract.   
1. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke are two of the original 
and foremost contributors to modern Social Contract 
Theory.19 A thorough discussion of Social Contract Theory 
could take volumes.  This chapter, however, will outline the 
basic tenets that prescribe a natural and contractual 
relationship between government and the governed.   
                     
 18  “The Declaration of Independence,” US History, 
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm (accessed on 
November 29, 2008). 
 19  Ernest Barker, Social Contract Theory, (Oxford University Press, 
1978), p. xi. 
 17
Hobbes and Lock agree that the social contract is based 
on the “natural state of man”.  However, they differ 
slightly on the definition of the “natural state”.  Hobbes 
suggests that all humans are naturally self-interested, and 
therefore act in brutal, self-serving ways.20  Locke, on the 
other hand, suggests the natural state of man is perfect 
liberty, not necessarily perfect license; in other words, 
man is naturally free to pursue self-interest, but not free 
to harm others.21  The arguments of Hobbes and Locke 
converge on the concept that man is rational and therefore 
came to understand the need for constraints against brutal 
self-interested behavior within society – this is manifested 
in the creation of government.22 
Hobbes and Locke slightly disagree on the nature of 
governance according to a social contract.  Hobbes suggests 
that in the natural state, man acts solely out of self 
interest.  Therefore, it is better for society to give up 
all personal rights to the government (or sovereign).23  
Locke argues that although man is self interested, he 
understands that he does not have the absolute right to do 
as he pleases.  Therefore, society may appoint a fiduciary 
or trustee government that it may dismiss for breach of the 
social contract.24  When boiled down, Hobbes and Locke posit 
that governmental authority and obligation are based on 
                     
 20  Celeste Friend, “The Social Contract,” The Internet Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/soc-cont.htm (accessed on 
September 5, 2008). 
 21  Ibid. 
 22  Barker, p. xii. 
 23  Ibid., p. xii. 
 24  Ibid., p. xiii. 
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individual self-interests, and the protection of society.  
In other words, government wields as much authority over the 
governed as the governed believe is in their self interest, 
and thus consent to be governed.  
Social Contract Theory implies certain obligations of 
government as society’s steward.  Political theorist Ernest 
Barker postulates that “The trustee has duties and not 
rights against the beneficiary; the beneficiary has rights 
and not duties as regards the trustee.”25  Where Hobbes 
suggests society surrenders all rights and power to the 
government, Locke insists that society retains the right 
(and obligation) to change government if the contract is 
breached.  Therefore, government must be responsive to 
society’s will, at least to some extent.  Whether openly 
acknowledged or not the social contract forms the basis of 
the relationship between the government and the governed.  
Although not explored in the this thesis it can be argued 
that repeated social contract violations, by the Shah’s 
regime, significantly fueled the social movements that led 
to the 1979 Iranian revolution.26   
2. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
SMT is actually an aggregation of related theories 
within the social sciences that seek to explain why and how 
society can mobilize to change the social and political 
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order.27  Three sub-theories of SMT are particularly useful 
for investigating Iran’s behavior. The first focuses on why 
social movements form.  The second and third posit how 
social movements gain focus, mass, and momentum to achieve 
political change. 
Theodore Robert Gurr’s theory of Relative Deprivation 
offers a causal explanation for social movements that lead 
to political violence and revolutionary change.28  Gurr 
defines Relative Deprivation as:  
actors’ perception of discrepancy between their 
value expectations and their value capabilities.  
Value expectations are the goods and conditions 
of life to which people believe they are 
rightfully entitled.  Value capabilities are the 
goods and conditions they think they are capable 
of getting and keeping.29   
Accordingly, Gurr hypothesizes that “the potential for 
collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and 
scope of relative deprivation among members of a 
collectivity.”30  Gurr’s theory suggests that the greater 
the discrepancy between expectations and reality, the 
greater the propensity for collective action.   
Although Relative Deprivation explains motivation, it 
does not necessarily answer how groups mobilize and assert 
their agendas effectively.  Once an individual, group, or 
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segment of society reaches the threshold of action to change 
the status quo, there must be uniting and organizing 
mechanisms to synergize the masses toward a focused effort.   
Specifically, Framing and resource mobilization theory 
explains how groups mobilize for change.  Framing explains 
the process of creating focus, meaning, and context for a 
social movement.  McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald define framing 
as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves 
that legitimate and motivate collective action.”31  Without 
effective framing, McAdam et al assert that it is highly 
unlikely that people will mobilize even when afforded the 
opportunity to do so.32 
Resource Mobilization theory explains how groups 
organize to challenge the status quo.  According to Diana 
Kendall, Resource Management focuses on the ability of 
members of a social movement to acquire resources and 
mobilize people in order to advance their cause.33 Resources 
include time, money, skills, materials, manpower, 
recruitment venues, access to media and communications, 
property, and equipment.34  Kendall asserts that assistance 
from, and alignment with, external organizations is also 
vital to a social movement’s momentum.35  McAdam et al 
concur with resource management theory when they discuss 
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Mobilizing Structures as a necessity for successful social 
movements.36  Resource Mobilization theory assumes that  
without such resources, social movements cannot be 
effective, and that dissent alone is not enough to stimulate 
change.37 
Finally, religion is an important asset to social 
movements, particularly in the case of Iran.  SMT is not a 
uniquely religious phenomenon.  However, sociologist 
Christian Smith asserts that religion adds important assets 
to social movements: organizational resources, social 
networks, shared identity, normative systems, public 
legitimacy, financial and other resources.  Smith states 
“organized religion is well-equipped to provide, when it so 
desires, these key resources to social movements.”38 Because 
religion gives people a sense of meaning and purpose, the 
marriage of religion and social movements can create an 
unstoppable force.    
Together Social Contract Theory and Social Movement 
Theory suggest that a government must, to some extent, be 
responsive to the will of society, or risk loss of support, 
uprising, possible rebellion, and even overthrow.  In regard 
to the social contract theory, we should see indications of 
society reacting to repeated violations or mismanagement of 
the social contract.  In turn, depending on the veracity of 
the violations and or reactions, we should being to see the 
organizing of social movements.  Therefore, civil society 
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lens allows us to hypothesize that we should see indications 
of the Iranian government reacting to social movements and 
pressures to either change policies or suppress the will of 
society. 
C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS LENS 
When looking inside the government to better understand 
Iran’s policy changes, we must first form an understanding 
of what Graham Allison describes as the “political game.”39  
Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics provides us with a 
causal argument to shape our political and bureaucracy lens.  
Allison asserts “Governmental behavior can be understood … 
not as organizational outputs, but as results of bargaining 
games.  Outcomes are formed, and deformed by the interaction 
of competing preferences.”40  Additionally, Allison claims 
that “To explain why a particular formal governmental 
decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental 
behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and 
players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and 
compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion.”41    
Too often, governmental behaviors and actions are 
evaluated based on the outcome of a decision process, while 
the internal workings of governments and bureaucracies are 
overlooked.  Likewise, political figures are evaluated based 
on definitions of their positions, not how their positions 
function, and the coalitions/alliances the incumbents 
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maintain.  To punctuate this assertion, Allison quotes an 
unnamed historian from 1965 who says “we know everything 
about the Presidents and nothing about the Presidency.”42 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model describes how 
unitary actors (even in very authoritarian states) do not 
necessarily determine the behaviors or actions of 
government.  Rather the individual actors, their roles and 
interaction, the situation, and the rules of the particular 
game form a synergistic effect that becomes governmental 
behavior and action.  Allison asserts that “when officials 
come together to take some action, the result will most 
often be different from what any of them intended before 
they began interacting as a group.  Each participant sits in 
a seat that confers separate responsibilities [and 
constituencies].  Each is committed to fulfilling his 
responsibilities as he sees them.”43 
Adding to the complexity of Allison’s model is the 
friction between elected officials, political appointees and 
bureaucrats.  Allison quotes Hugh Helco when describing the 
nature of governmental power and gamesmanship.44  Helco 
states “Political leadership is transient, in that it 
depends on a particular individual and his or her changing 
supplies of outside power. Bureaucratic power, on the other  
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hand is non-problematic and enduring. It is automatically 
attached to those people who continuously operate the 
machinery of government.”45  
Allison’s model suggests that in order to understand 
the actions and behaviors of government, we must examine a) 
the players (agendas, coalitions, constituencies, and 
alliances), b) the context of the situation, and c) the 
rules of the game.  Because the Iranian government is a 
complex mix of theocratic rigidity and democratic 
flexibility, it is difficult to understand and articulate 
its interworking. Nonetheless, an examination of the Iranian 
governmental structure and interworking is important when 
evaluating internal causes of change.  Therefore, we can 
hypothesize that if internal governmental frictions are 
driving change, we should be able to identify and observe 
the dynamics between the various governmental processes, 
entities, and personalities, and draw direct correlations to 
the observed changes. 
D. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS LENS 
In the book the Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz, 
an international relations theorist, attempts to understand 
the causes of international war.  To do this, he considers 
three levels of analysis, what he calls “images“-- human 
nature, the nation-state, and the international system.  His 
first image is rooted in the innate qualities of humans.  He 
concludes that human nature does indeed play a role in the  
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perpetuation of conflict; however, independently it is an 
insufficient tool for analyzing the cause of international 
conflict.   
Waltz’s second image examines the internal character of 
the nation-state.  The second image suggests that the 
internal construct and ideology of the state is the impetus 
of interstate conflict, and that “bad states” make war. 
However, Waltz observes that—“peace and war are the products 
of good and bad states respectively.”46   
The third image centers on the international system in 
which states operate.  Waltz notes that the international 
system is marked by anarchy, with no overarching authority, 
forcing states to overreact to ensure their security.  Waltz 
concludes that the international system—frustrated by 
perpetual anarchy—best explains the conditions that cause 
states to go to war to ensure their security.   
Economist, Peter Gourevitch builds off of Waltz’s three 
images to consider conditions under which the international 
system shapes domestic politics.  He calls this “the second 
image reversed.”  Gourevitch argues that certain external 
factors influence the way in which states behave 
domestically.  He posits that the amount of power a state 
wields, a state’s economic standing, and the ideology of the 
international community, all have a profound impact on 
domestic politics.  The impact could include, but are not  
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limited to, the adoption or modification of policies, the 
development of a specific regime types, and coalition 
patterns.47 
When investigating Iran we will use Gourevitch’s second 
image reversed argument to evaluate the extent to which 
economics, international ideology, and Iran’s ostracism from 
the international community affect its domestic behavior.  
Quoting Mitchell Reiss: “If the structure of the state and 
its system of governance shapes human behavior, then the 
structure of the international system must also shape state 
behavior.”48  The International Politics lens posits that if 
the international arena is driving change within Iranian’s 
domestic politics, then we should be able to see the Iranian 
government reacting to specific changes in the in the 
international arena.  For example, this lens predicts that 
Iran would change its domestic behavior in reaction to 
international pressure to curtail its pursuit of nuclear 
technology. 
Using these three lenses—Civil Society; Bureaucratic 
Politics; and the International System—to focus our 
attention, we can now examine the three periods of change 
more thoroughly to reveal key motivators and influencers for 
the observed shifts in the Iranian political and 
governmental landscape.  Do the root causes for these shifts 
come from the Iranian society, political and bureaucratic 
infighting, or the international arena?  Our analysis will 
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reveal that it is often a combination of two or more lenses 
(at varying degrees) that synergistically drive governmental 
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IV. KHOMEINI YEARS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Khomeini years (1978-1989) began with the Iranian 
revolution, which replaced the Shah’s western-leaning 
monarchy with an Islamic-based government led by Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini.  Radical clerics dominated the majority 
of government institutions, and controlled the state 
bureaucracy.  Four key events marked the decade of 
Khomeini’s reign: the 1979 revolution, the 1979-81 hostage 
crisis, the establishment of Iran as an Islamic Republic, 
and the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.  The revolutionary 
government was presented with a host of challenges: a decade 
of constant economic blockades, international pressures, and 
isolationism.49   
The year 1978 brought with it mounting malaise and 
discontent continued amongst the Iranian populace, resulting 
from years of oppression, unrealized political promises, and 
increasing economic difficulties.  Despite an increase in 
oil revenues, the Shah’s government continued to hoard 
profits and ignored increasing internal strife.50  
Oppositionists became openly critical of the Pahlavi 
regime.51  Strikes and riots ensued which culminated in a 
                     
 49  John L. Eposito, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact 
(Miami: International University Press, 1990), p. 63.  
 50  Keddie, p. 214.  
 51  Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran from the crowning of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
in 1925 to the overthrow of Reza Shah Pahlavi's son Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  Its collapse marks a break 
in the ancient tradition of Iranian monarchy. 
 30
massive popular uprising.  From exile Ayatollah Khomeini 
became the symbol of Iranian resistance to the oppressive 
nature of the Shah’s regime.  As the Shah’s power waned, he 
was unable to maintain control of the growing opposition.  
Thus, in January 1979 he and his family fled the country, 
never to return.52  In the Shah’s absence, Ayatollah 
Khomeini returned to Iran, declaring “Islam” the true path 
for Iran.  Iran became an Islamic Republic April 1979, by 
popular referendum.  
In late 1979, the exiled Shah sought medical treatment 
for cancer in the United States.  The Iranian population 
vehemently objected to the United States’ support of the 
Shah and demanded his immediate return to Iran for trial.53  
In protest, on November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized the 
U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 52 American hostages.  The 
444 day hostage crisis ended in January 1981 after the 
Shah’s death and successful negotiations between the U.S. 
and the Iranian government.54  This was the watershed event 
that forever changed Iran and U.S. relations. 
In September 1980, on the heels of Iran’s establishment 
of the new Islamic Republic, came a protracted war with its 
neighbor and long time rival, Iraq.  Iran was forced to 
shift its focus from reconstruction of the country to the 
issues of war and survival.  The war, which lasted almost 
eight years (September 1980 – August 1988), was very costly  
                     
 52  Keddie, p. 234. 
 53  Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic 
Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 24. 
 54  Ibid. 
 31
in terms of casualties and economic losses.  The two 
countries finally accepted a UN resolution calling for a 
ceasefire in August of 1988.   
After the war, Khomeini and his regime refocused their 
attention to institutionalizing the revolution.  Iran’s 
corroding socio-economic conditions were no longer masked by 
the hostage crisis or the war.  International isolationism, 
economic sanctions, population growth and production 
declines created serious economic challenges for the 
government.  Iran’s revolutionary past, coupled with 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions, forced Iran to re-
vector on a course with greater pragmatism and efficiency in 
state-building.55   
This chapter offers an analysis of Iran’s political 
climate during Ayatollah’s Khomeini‘s reign.  We examine the 
transition of power after the revolution from a monarchic 
government under the Shah, to a theocratic republic under 
Khomeini, and the effects of these events on Iran’s future 
political and governmental system.  We will use the three 
analytical lenses developed in chapter three: civil society, 
bureaucratic politics, and international politics, to 
analyze Iran’s mélange of theocratic-democratic soup, which 
will help to determine the impetus for ideological change 
within the Iran’s political system during the Khomeini era.  
We suggest that although civil society provided the initial 
impetus for change, which sparked the revolution, it was 
Khomeini’s masterful manipulation of the socio-political  
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environment that ultimately dove change within this era.  
Therefore, we see the bureaucratic politics lens having the 
most impact during this period. 
B. CIVIL SOCIETY  
The civil society lens reveals that with sufficient 
cause, the people will mobilize against the government when 
their needs and grievances are not met.  Thus, the 
government must, to some degree, be responsive to those 
needs, so as to avoid losing societal support and or 
inciting an uprising, rebellion, or overthrow.  We will use 
this lens to analyze the degree to which the actions of 
society ignited change within the Iranian government during 
the Khomeini Years.   
In the final years of the Shah’s regime, repression, 
and economic problems, combined with Khomeini’s popularity 
to mobilize the country for political change.  Khomeini’s 
words became the fuel that ignited the revolutionary fire.  
He asserted that a return to an Islamic-based culture would 
solve the country’s problems.  This message had a unifying 
and mobilizing effect on Iran’s Muslim masses, who became 
more courageous and willing to openly oppose the Shah’s 
regime.56  Increasing numbers throughout Iranian society 
joined the revolutionary movement.  Large-scale strikes 
began which created a downward economic spiral and 
ultimately paralyzed the economy.57  During a massive 
demonstration in Tehran in early December, 1978, united 
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opposition groups signed a resolution calling for the 
overthrow of the Shah and for Khomeini to lead Iran. 
The unpopularity of the Shah grew as he failed to 
deliver on promises of political and economic 
decentralization, resulting in outbreaks of violence within 
the country.  The Shah made meager attempts to defuse the 
opposition through government reforms in the judiciary and 
by appointing a moderate opposition prime minister.  
However, the long history of autocracy, corruption, 
imprisonment, and torture left the Iranians callused to any 
of the Shah’s promises of freedoms and economic reforms.58   
In February 1979, the Shah’s regime collapsed under the 
weight of its own corruption.59  The revolutionary movement 
united many opposition groups, with differing ideologies 
under the unified objective of overthrowing the Shah; 
however, there were deep seated divisions within the 
country.  This ultimately led to power struggles between the 
various revolutionary factions: democratic forces verses 
fundamentalists-leftists; Islamic revolutionaries verses the 
leftist revolutionaries; and conservatives-pragmatist 
fundamentalists verses the radical fundamentalists.60  
Iran’s new social-political order largely sprang from the 
struggles between these power bases.  
Democratic forces were an integral catalyst during the 
prerevolutionary movements; however, they lacked real 
ideological foundation.  These forces advocated for 
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political reform, which was misaligned with the concerns of 
the revolution.  Leftists sought to implement social and 
economic change through new policies and redistribution of 
wealth, but they were unable to garner enough popular 
support for their programs.  They could not compete with 
Khomeini radical fundamental rhetoric and his proposed 
utopian Islamic state.61  Khomeini and his radical 
fundamentalist regime dominated the revolutionary movement 
and carried the overwhelming majority of popular support. 
As Khomeini and his regime usurped the power of the 
state, they imposed laws that conformed more to Shariah 
(Islamic law).  They enforced higher standards of religious 
stricture: required Islamic dress, outlawed liquor, certain 
music, and western films.  This culminated in 1982 with the 
Supreme Judicial Council rendering all non-Islamic code 
null.62  The decree of strict Sharia rule prompted a mass 
exodus of four million dissatisfied entrepreneurs and 
professionals, facilitating a “brain drain,” which left an 
intellectual void that adversely affected Iran’s economy and 
state infrastructure.63  This void was filled by less 
qualified revolutionary activists during a time when state-
building was not the principal focus of the Iranian people. 
Although costly in terms of resources, economics, and 
casualties, the war with Iraq served as a unifying 
mechanism, which consolidated Iranian solidarity and popular 
support of the new government.  In light of the war efforts 
that spanned the majority of Khomeini’s reign, societal 
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needs were inconsequential when juxtaposed with the needs of 
the country.  The sacrifices of the Iranian people during 
this time of international isolation, etched a strong sense 
of nationalistic pride and independence into a fragmented 
revolutionary effort.     
The Khomeini years were a period of social and 
political turmoil, highlighted by the revolution, hostage 
crisis, brain drain, and the Iran-Iraq war.64  Societal 
needs were marginalized by the government, which, 
surreptitiously consolidated power under a radical 
fundamentalist Islamic theocracy while the population was 
distracted.  Many hoped the revolution would bring about 
economic reform, and other civil liberties.  Khomeini, like 
the Shah, made a variety of promises to the Iranians that 
ultimately were not realized under his regime.  
Consequently, the economy failed to burgeon and poverty 
rates rose by nearly 45% during the first 6 years of the 
Islamic revolution.65   
In the aftermath of the war and final year of 
Khomeini’s life, Iranian society refocused its attention on 
the mounting socioeconomic issues.  After the death of 
Khomeini, the successive regime faced unresolved issues of 
economic reform and state-building.  
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C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
The bureaucratic politics lens posits that dynamics 
between actors and institutions in the government determine 
the behaviors and actions of the state, not the individual 
agendas and ideologies of the players or institutions 
themselves.  We will use this lens to examine the dynamics 
between the key players and institutions of the Iranian 
government and their collective effect on the government’s 
ideologies and agendas during the Khomeini era.   
The Revolution changed Iran’s political landscape, 
where the balance of power shifted from government to 
society through a mass mobilization and uprising of the 
populace.  Following the overthrow of the Shah, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his followers fervently went about the business 
of establishing theocratic order within Iran.  In the 
background of the hostage crisis, Iran held elections for 
the Assembly of Experts and parliament.   
The struggle between Iran and the United States further 
legitimized the provisional government’s authority.  Radical 
clerics dominated parliament and secured the majority of 
seats within the assembly, which granted them overwhelming 
favor in the revision of the constitution.  With an 
overwhelming Islamic ideological influence in the assembly, 
the final constitution included the clerical flavor Khomeini 
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was looking for.  The concept of a velayat-e-faqih66 formed 
the basis for the new constitution, whereby the faqih 
(Supreme Leader) would oversees all national affairs.  This 
position was given unlimited power and responsibility, and 
is subject only to Islamic law.  Khomeini distributed power 
amongst the government institution in order to secure the 
legacy of the Islamic theocracy, and to ensure only those 
who shared the same vision would command critical 
institutions.67  Under Khomeini’s vision, the most critical 
positions of theocratic leadership (Supreme Leader, Guardian 
Council and judiciary) would remain on the outskirts of the 
democratic processes (unelected), thus isolating the core 
elements of state power from the will of the people (see 
figure 1.1).68  
In December 1979, by popular referendum, the new 
constitution was ratified, which made Ayatollah Khomeini 
Iran’s first supreme leader.69  With Khomeini and his 
radical cleric winning the preponderance of seats within the 
parliament and the Assembly of Experts, and wielding 
significant influence over the ratified constitution, the 
seeds of the Islamic theocracy were beginning to sprout.   
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In the beginning of Khomeini’s reign, he oversaw the 
merger of the post-revolutionary provisional government into 
Iran’s new governmental structure.  At first, he allowed a 
façade of secularism to prevail by appointing Mehdi 
Bazargan, a non-cleric, as prime minister. Khomeini also 
backed Bani Sadr, another non-cleric, in the first 
presidential election.70  Simultaneously, he began to 
increase the power of the underlying clerical institutions 
and he created a kind of parallel Islamic government.71  
Behind the scenes, Khomeini’s radical cleric regime began to 
usurp power from other political parties within the new 
government.  In the beginning, the process was relatively 
subtle, as much of the government’s bureaucracy remained 
secular.  The Council of the Islamic Revolution and the 
Islamic Republic Party were created as a means of increasing 
the clerical power base.  Khomeinists began to dominate many 
key government institutions: judiciary, parliament, and the 
Assembly of Experts.72 
Although many groups, classes, and parties formed a 
united front in the effort to free Iran from the stronghold 
of the Shah’s regime, there were many who opposed Khomeini’s 
strict version of Islam and his quest for complete clerical 
rule.73  Despite this opposition, there was no significant 
resistance to Khomeini’s maneuvering.  His charisma and 
popularity enabled Khomeini to assert his influence with 
relative ease.  To complete the transformation of Iran to a 
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theocratic state, the cleric leadership was faced with the 
task of ousting the remaining competitors from positions of 
power.   
Opposition groups surfaced as Khomeini’s plan for 
single-party rule began to take shape.  Secret trials were 
held for those who opposed the revolution; several hundred 
members of the secular regime were executed.74  By the end 
of 1980, Khomeini and his followers dominated all 
governmental institutions with the exception of the 
presidency and a few key cabinet positions.75 
The onset of the Iran-Iraq war greatly enhanced the 
regime’s legitimacy, and afforded Khomeini significant 
leeway to pursue his ideological politics and theocratic 
agenda.76  Khomeini continued to solidify his position as  
Supreme Leader and the power of Islamic rule over the key 
government positions.  Throughout the mid 1980s, Khomeini’s 
political power and molding of Iran’s government 
overshadowed almost all other governmental interactions.     
The atmosphere in Iran’s government began to change in 
the late 1980s.  Despite Khomeini’s tremendous success in 
consolidating theocratic power and marginalizing the 
opposition, divisions between radicals, hardliners, 
pragmatists, and conservatives, began to emerge following 
the war with Iraq.  Even before Ayatollah Khomeini’s death 
in 1989, the radical cleric monopoly started to give way to 
more economically-minded, pragmatic clerics, politicians and 
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technocrats.77  The main-stream clergy and religious leaders 
at the time, as well as many within the executive and 
parliamentary branches of government, favored less religious 
involvement in the government and the legal system.  This 
growing mindset convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to disavow his 
supposed successor, Ayatollah Montazeri, who began to openly 
question the legitimacy of the faqih’s position as Iran’s 
supreme political power, and suggested to limit the faqih’s 
authority to the realm of religion.78  Because of this rift 
with the less-radical clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini selected 
then President Ali Khamenei as his successor.  Khamenei had 
significantly more political than clerical experience, but 
was a devout follower of Khomeini.  Therefore, Khomeini 
trusted him to carry on Iran’s theocratic institutions.79  
With Khomeini’s health declining and rifts opening up inside 
and outside of the government, the stage was set for 
transition into the reformist period. 
D. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The international politics lens posits that there is a 
cause and effect relationship between the state and 
international system.  Not only does the state affect the 
behavior and actions of the international system; but 
conversely, the international system shapes the behavior and 
actions of the state.  The latter is the focus of this 
section.  We will use the international politics lens to 
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determine to what extent the international system affects 
the actions and behaviors of the Iranian government.   
Two main issues dominated Iran’s foreign policy during 
the Khomeini Years: (1) the U.S. hostage crisis, and (2) the 
Iran-Iraq War.  Each played a significant role in shaping 
Iranian foreign policy.  
U.S. Hostage Crisis:  Shorty after fleeing Iran, the 
Shah sought cancer treatment in the United States.  Iranian 
students, outraged by U.S. meddling in the past, viewed the 
Shah’s admittance to the U.S. as a prelude to planning 
another coup.80  In response, they seized the American 
Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 American hostages.  This was a 
major event on the international stage, which significantly 
impacted both Iran and the United States.  
From the international perspective, the crisis hurled 
Iran into a complete state of isolation, which heavily 
impacted its political and economic institutions.  
Conversely, it also generated a positive internal affects on 
Iran’s new clerical government.  Khomeini radicalized the 
populace by framing the crisis as an effort by the United 
States to sabotage the revolution.  This unified divisions 
within the government and galvanized popular support for the 
new theocratic state.  The embassy take-over became the 
Islamic Republic’s first national expression of its 
resolve.81   
The 444 day stand-off carried a heavy economic and 
political price tag for Iran.  The U.S. retaliated by 
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placing sanctions on trade, embargos on Iranian oil, 
freezing billions of dollars in Iranian assets, and severing 
all U.S. ties.82  Iran became the center of a large-scaled 
economic boycott and was branded with the scarlet letter “O” 
for outlaw.   
The hostage crisis was the watershed moment that 
forever changed the relationship between Iran and the United 
States.  Following the death of the Shah, Iran lost its 
bargaining power and engaged in negotiations for the release 
of the hostages.  Despite the peaceful resolution of the 
crisis, Iran’s status in the international community did not 
improve. 
Iran-Iraq War:  The Iran-Iraq war began when Iraq 
invaded Iran in September of 1980 over a border dispute.  
During this eight years war, over one million Iranians were 
either wounded or killed.83  Despite being ostracized by the 
international community, a scarcity of resources, a crippled 
economy, and an arms embargo imposed by the U.S., Iran still 
managed to survive the war.  
Although Iran did not initiate the war, it was greatly 
responsible for its eight year duration.  Iran rejected 
numerous calls for a cease fire by its neighbors, the UN, 
and even Iraq.  In his book Hidden Iran, Iran expert Ray 
Takeyh suggests that Khomeini used the war as both a 
unifying mechanism and a cover for his political 
maneuvering.84  Therefore, Khomeini was in no rush to end a 
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war that was benefiting his consolidation of power.  It was 
not until an Iranian commercial airliner was accidently shot 
down by the USS Vincennes in July 1998, and the growing 
potential for direct U.S. military intervention, that 
Khomeini was finally swayed to end the war.85   
Despite poor internal economic conditions, Iran emerged 
from the Iran-Iraq war with relatively low international 
debt and a significantly latent wealth of oil resources.86  
These circumstances created a window of opportunity for 
Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani, and President Khamenei to 
embark on programs of economic reform and build 
international trade relations, which set the stage for both 
to lead Iran during the Reformist years. 
E. ANALYSIS 
When examining the Khomeini years, we see a period 
defined by revolution, international crisis, war, and the 
construction of an Islamic government.  The events of this 
period took the country through socioeconomic lulls, 
repression, poverty, and isolation.  Each lens presents an 
alternative vantage point from which to examine the shifts 
in policy and governmental agendas.  
The Khomeini years began with Iranians’ quest to 
overthrow the monarchic regime of the Shah.  As discussed in 
the civil society lens, society was the initial impetus of 
change during this period.  However, society’s ability to 
affect governmental change was significantly marginalized 
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due to the onset to the war and growing differences between 
the various revolutionary factions.  The bureaucratic lens 
illustrates how Khomeini and his supporters capitalized on 
the war distractions and the fragmented revolutionary 
movement, by instituting Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic 
theocracy.  Through the international lens, we see how 
external pressures associated with the hostage crisis and 
the war with Iraq increased internal solidarity and rallied 
support for Khomeini’s radical ideology and fundamentalist 
approach to state-building.  Although the international 
arena was not the primary impetus for governmental change it 
was certainly a significant enabler for the clerically led 
state building process.   
Ultimately throughout this period, all governmental 
change was linked to Khomeini’s relationship with the 
Iranian people and his influence over Iran’s political 
apparatus.  Thus, setting the stage for the reformist 
seeking change the government power centers and institute 
new policies to improve the socioeconomic conditions within 
the country.  
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V. REFORMIST YEARS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The reformist years (1989-2003) began with the death 
of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and the end of the eight year 
war with Iraq.  The new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, 
and President Rafsanjani, inherited an internationally 
isolated, economically troubled, and internally divided 
country.87  President Rafsanjani, despite being an ardent 
follower of Khomeini, favored economic reform, improved 
relations with the west, and decreased radical influences 
within Iran’s government.88  Rafsanjani and his supporters 
implemented several strategies designed to dilute the 
influence of radical clerics and to edge them out of 
positions of power within the executive and bureaucratic 
branches of government.89  Beginning with President 
Rafsanjani’s economic reform efforts and continuing with 
President Khatami’s push for greater press, civil, and 
democratic reforms, the reformists made slow but appreciable 
headway. This time period was punctuated by several key 
events: the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. sanctions and embargos,  
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internal movements for social reform, greater civil rights 
and expanded freedom of the press, and efforts to improve 
international relations.   
Despite popular support for the reformists and their 
agendas, the radicals, hardliners, and conservative clergy 
retained control of significant religious, governmental, and 
political power bases; they proved to be staunch adversaries 
of any real change.90  After more than a decade of struggle 
and political gamesmanship, the reformist movement became 
mired in the global environment following the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Arguably, the reformist movement began 
its decline following President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech 
in 2002, which served to strengthen the position of radicals 
and hard-line conservatives.91 
We will examine the reformist period using the filters 
of our three analytical lenses: civil society, bureaucratic 
politics, and international relations.  This process will 
allow us to explore and better understand the factors that 
drove Iranian politics during this period.  We will see that 
change during this period (unlike the Khomeini years where 
change emanated primarily from a single lens) was driven by 
a combination of influences emanating from all three lenses. 
B. CIVIL SOCIETY 
The civil society lens suggests that the people, when 
sufficiently motivated and mobilized, can place pressure on 
the government to address a perceived grievance or 
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injustice.  In turn, the government must, to some extent, be 
sensitive to the will of the people and react in some manner 
to either suppress or appease the people.  Using this lens 
we can focus on the society-government relationship to 
investigate the extent to which civil society drove changes 
within the Iranian government during the reformist period. 
Two main factors emerge as the primary motivators for 
social pressure and influence on government during this time 
frame: a) socioeconomic conditions and b) civil liberties.  
Leading into this period, internal socioeconomic conditions 
dominated popular attention, but gave way to increased 
demand for civil liberties.  These pursuits were manifested 
through a combination of public demonstrations and 
democratic processes.  
Economic conditions: Due to very little freedom of the 
press, and governmental intolerance for public displays of 
dissatisfaction, the “ground truth” of Post-Khomeini 
socioeconomic conditions and popular opinions is somewhat 
speculative.  However, there are indications that soaring 
inflation, shortages of goods, and high unemployment rates, 
a disproportionate distribution of wealth, and a 
disenfranchised populace impacted the government leading 
into the reformist years.92  During the Iran-Iraq war, these 
problems could be blamed on the “armies of arrogance” and 
“the Great Satan” who had imposed an informal economic 
blockade on Iran.93  Following the war, Iranians generally 
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expected the situation to improve quickly, but the 
government understood the dangers associated with unmet 
expectations and constantly warned the people not to expect 
“too much, too soon”.94 
At the beginning of the reformist years, Iran’s economy 
was in turmoil.  Official unemployment was at 15 per cent, 
but unofficial (and likely more accurate) unemployment was 
closer to 25-30 per cent.95  Per-capita income declined 45 
per cent between 1977 and 1990, and people were making 
considerably less than under the Shah’s regime.96  
Exacerbating the situation was the fact that despite 
increased reliance on imports, domestic productivity was 
only 20-25 per cent of pre-revolution levels.97  President 
Rafsanjani was acutely aware that the socioeconomic 
situation needed to change, and almost immediately began 
pursuing economic reform measures to appease growing civil 
discontent and expectations.98 
Between 1989 and 1991, Rafsanjani’s economic reforms 
(increased international trade, foreign investment, and 
renewed emphasis on education) gave Iran a much needed 
boost, which garnered increased popular support and power.99  
However, Rafsanjani faced significant opposition from 
radicals and hardliners within government, and by 1992 his 
reforms began to falter, causing increased civil impatience 
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and unrest.  In April 1992, riots and demonstrations broke 
out and began to spread due to deteriorating infrastructure, 
poor social services, inadequate housing, and rampant 
inflation.100  Although the government’s reaction was 
minimal, the 1992 riots (though short lived) marked the 
first major demonstrations of civil discontent since the 
revolution.   
In 1992, the government initiated the first reform-
oriented changes since the revolution that can be, at least 
partially, attributed to civil society.  Popular discontent 
with economic conditions during the 1992 parliamentary 
elections contributed to giving a clear majority to 
pragmatic conservative politicians and supporters of 
economic reforms.  Thus, President Rafsanjani, with support 
from the people, was able to remove the majority of radicals 
and hardliners from both the Executive and Parliamentary 
branches.101 
Following the 1992 parliamentary elections, 
Rafsanjani’s reform efforts improved internal socioeconomic 
conditions considerably, but also had the unintended effect 
of disproportionately redistributing the wealth, and 
creating a more educated, socially and culturally active, 
yet underemployed middle class.102  Additionally, Iran’s 
population had experienced a 45 percent increase during the 
1980s, a “youth bulge” of more than 16 million people for 
which the economy and job market could not accommodate.103  
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These problems carried forward into the late 1990s, and 
erupted during the presidential elections in 1997. 
Civil Liberties: During the mid 1990s, Rafsanjani’s 
economic reforms and marginalization of radicals and hard-
line conservatives led to more openness within society and 
increased public debate of the cleric-led suppression of 
civil liberties.104  Despite the appearance of relaxed 
control over the press and individual freedoms, a growing 
portion of Iran’s population was becoming more vocal and 
demanding on the government for increased civil liberties, 
jobs, and economic prosperity.105   
Although Rafsanjani and other reformists were gaining 
popularity with the people, the Council of Guardians 
intervened in the 1996 parliamentary elections to give 
majority control back to conservatives (discussed later).106  
This move weakened Rafsanjani’s position as he neared the 
end of his second term in office.  To further counter the 
reformist movement, Ayatollah Khamenei publically backed a 
conservative candidate, Nateq Nuri, in the 1997 presidential 
elections. 
Population growth in the early days of the revolution 
had produced a young, educated, and discontented voting-age 
constituency that made up roughly 25 percent of Iran’s 
population of 67 million in 1997.107  Additionally, a great 
proportion of revolutionary and Iran-Iraq war veterans were 
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becoming disillusioned and seeking a “renegotiation of the 
social contract”.108  Presidential candidate Mohammad 
Khatami, a former minister of culture and head of the 
National Library, was known as an intellectual who tried to 
reconcile Islam with liberal democracy.109  His platform of 
governmental reform, greater freedoms, rule of law, and 
improved civil society was very popular with Iranians.110   
The 1997 presidential campaign and elections set the 
stage for a showdown between the writ of the Supreme Leader 
and demands of the Iranian people.  This election marked the 
first time since the revolution in which the Iranian people 
became the primary impetus for real governmental change.111  
A record number of voters gave Mohammad Khatami a landslide 
victory with almost 70 percent of the vote.  The results of 
the election marked a major turning point in relations 
between the state and society, and sent a clear message to 
the conservative leadership that the people were unhappy.  
As such, the 1997 elections were dubbed the “second 
revolution” and put conservatives on the defensive.112 
President Khatami was initially somewhat successful in 
pursuing his reform agenda, but the conservative controlled 
Parliament moved to limit his abilities by siding more 
closely with Ayatollah Khamenei.113  Increased press freedoms 
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led to an explosion of reform-oriented publications by 
1998.114  However, the hard-line conservative judiciary moved 
quickly to close publications that were deemed too reformist 
or liberal, and often jailed journalists to suppress 
criticism of the Supreme Leader or cleric power base.115  By 
1999, Iranians, particularly university students who by and 
large supported Khatami, were becoming impatient with the 
pace of reform.  Student protests in 1999 were met with 
swift, forceful crackdowns by security forces controlled by 
Khamenei and the cleric-led judiciary.116   
Public unrest and demand for reform, as well as 
frustration over Khatami’s inability to influence real 
change, led to another showdown during the 2000 
parliamentary elections.  Again, the Iranian people voiced 
their frustrations through the ballot, and handed Parliament 
to the reformists with 71 percent of the seats.117 
For the remainder of the reformist period, despite 
control of the presidency and parliament, the reformists 
were not able to make significant headway.  Khatami failed 
to gain much support from Ayatollah Khamenei, and the 
Council of Guardians vetoed most reform-oriented legislation 
passed by Parliament.118  After humiliating defeats in the 
1997 and 2000 elections, conservatives and hardliners, 
backed by the Council of Guardians and cleric-led Judiciary, 
went on the offensive to undermine the reformists by 
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eliminating most reforms, such as a more liberal press, and 
instilling stricter social controls.119   
September 11th, and Iran’s subsequent inclusion in 
President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech in early 2002 
considerably dulled public objection to the stricter 
conservative measures.120  As we will see in the political 
bureaucratic and international relations lenses, the U.S.’s 
increasingly menacing rhetoric played a significant role in 
facilitating a hard-line backlash against the reformists.  
Although public opinion polls in the fall of 2002 (post 
“Axis of Evil” speech) indicated that over 74 percent of 
Iranians favored improved relations with the U.S., the 
public’s declining support for the reformists and muffled 
objection to conservative suppression of the press, media, 
and civil liberties, was a tacit vote of confidence for the 
conservatives.121 
Unfortunately, Khatami’s last and perhaps best 
opportunity to ensure future reform was unintentionally 
derailed by events in the civil sector.  In late 2002, 
Khatami and the Parliament passed two bills aimed at 
strengthening the position of the President and limiting the 
Guardian Council’s power to veto legislation.122  At the 
time, Khatami was in a strong position to force passage of 
the bills by threatening to resign and de-legitimate the 
government at the height of public support for a national 
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referendum.123  However, the conservative cleric-led 
judiciary stepped up attacks on reform supporters which 
sparked another round of violent student protests that 
forced Khatami to postpone efforts to push the bills 
through.124  By the time the social unrest settled down in 
early 2003, the pending U.S. invasion of Iraq further 
strengthened the conservatives by diverting public attention 
away from internal strife.  Khatami and the reformists had 
lost their momentum, and the Guardian Council vetoed the 
bills with minimal protest. 
As we will see in the next section, much of the events 
and themes in the civil society lens overlap with the 
bureaucratic politics lens.  This is especially true when it 
comes to the government’s inter-workings that manifest as a 
result of, or as a counter to, social pressure.  
C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model describes how 
individuals (even in very authoritarian states) do not 
necessarily determine the behaviors or actions of 
government.  Rather individual actors — their roles, 
interactions, the situation, and the rules of the government 
– has a compounding effect that becomes the government’s 
behavior.  Therefore, when using the bureaucratic politics 
lens, it is important to focus more on the players in the 
government and the interactions, and less on specific 
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motivating themes.  This section will therefore focus on the 
main players during this period; the Ayatollah Khamenei 
(Supreme Leader), President Rafsanjani (1989-1997), 
President Khatami (1997-2005), Parliament, The Guardian 
Council, and the Judiciary. 
In 1989, Iran’s President, Ali Khamenei, and 
Parliamentary Speaker, Ali Rafsanjani, oversaw changes to 
the Iranian constitution which would eliminate the position 
of Prime Minister, and consolidate executive power with the 
President.125  Khamenei and Rafsanjani were not known for 
their theological credentials, and neither ranked 
particularly high in the country’s religious hierarchy.126  
However, both had gained stature and political prominence 
during the revolutionary struggle through close ties with 
Khomeini and time spent managing governmental affairs.127   
Just months before his death in 1989, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s rift with main-stream clerics who questioned his 
vision of the Velayat-e Faqih, forced him to select a 
successor with somewhat weaker cleric credentials.128  
Khomeini directed changes that strengthened the 
constitutional authority of the Supreme Leader.  This was 
likely to diffuse religious-based opposition to Khamenei’s 
designation as his successor.  Khomeini’s relatively quick 
demise left a sense of urgency and confusion in the upper  
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ranks of government, and Khamenei’s selection as Khomeini’s 
successor was seen as a compromise by the clerical 
authorities.129  
Khamenei’s initial lack of strong credentials 
significantly weakened the relationship between religion and 
politics in Iran– at least for a while.130  To strengthen his 
position as Supreme Leader, Khamenei had to seek and build 
support from the conservative clergy who were reluctant to 
back him until they determined that his political leadership 
compensated for his lack of religious qualifications.131    
With Khomeini’s death, and the brief reduction in 
religiously motivated politics, many of the radicals had 
lost their top cover.132  This lapse allowed Rafsanjani, with 
Khamenei’s approval, to seize the initiative toward reducing 
radical influence within the Executive branch and state 
bureaucracy.133  Rafsanjani replaced many of the hard-line 
and radical clerics with more knowledgeable technocrats in 
key positions to facilitate his pragmatic economic reform 
agenda.134 
As noted in the civil society lens, Rafsanjani was 
keenly aware of the socioeconomic conditions coming out of 
the 1980s.  At the time of Rafsanjani’s election in 1989, 
the Parliament was dominated by hardliners and radical 
clerics.  As such, Rafsanjani’s economic reforms were 
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hindered by Parliament in his early years.  During the 1992 
parliamentary elections, Khamenei allowed Rafsanjani to 
exert influence on the Guardian Council’s vetting process to 
eliminate most hard-line and radical candidates.135  The 
result strengthened Rafsanjani’s and Khamenei’s standings, 
and all but eliminated the radicals as main contenders for 
power.136 
Following the 1992 parliamentary elections, Rafsanjani 
was able to more aggressively pursue his economic reforms 
which included privatization of portions of state controlled 
infrastructure.137  This privatization resulted in one of 
Rafsanjani’s main criticisms, rampant corruption and 
enrichment of the political and clerical elite.138  The 
clergy allowed Rafsanjani to privatize some economic 
activity, but not to challenge the clergy’s role in the 
economy; “Privatization only occurred in ways that allowed 
those closest to the regime to profit by buying up state 
enterprises when they were put on the market.”139  Despite 
the criticism of corruption, Rafsanjani was re-elected in 
1993.  However, his inability to make significant economic 
headway would diminish his position leading into the 1996 
parliamentary elections. 
While Rafsanjani was pursuing economic reform in the 
early 1990s, Ayatollah Khamenei was busy consolidating his 
power among the conservative cleric elite.  Khamenei 
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followed Rafsanjani’s lead and began purging members of the 
radical factions from the Guardian Council and judiciary.140 
Khamenei also took advantage of his rising influence over 
the cleric leadership to strengthen his political powers at 
the expense of elected officials.141  Although not as 
charismatic as his predecessor, Khamenei was considerably 
more politically savvy given his experience as president.  
Where Khomeini sought to define the ideology of the state, 
Khamenei sought to manage the state through ideology.142  He 
curtailed Rafsanjani’s powers by assuming control over the 
armed forces and various foundations that controlled vast 
financial resources and managed large social services.143 
Despite working together to reduce radical and 
hardliner influence in government, a fundamental split began 
to develop between Rafsanjani and Khamenei leading into the 
1996 parliamentary elections.144  Rafsanjani’s primarily-
conservative political party was divided into pragmatics who 
supported reform, and traditional conservatives who opposed 
it.  Turmoil in the Rafsanjani camp gave conservatives a 
boost.  Although Khamenei avoided public debate, it was 
evident that he supported a more conservative Parliament.145   
As in the 1992 elections, the Guardian Council’s 
candidate vetting in 1996 played a big part in determining 
the election’s outcome.  This time however, it was 
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Rafsanjani and reformists who lost control of Parliament to 
more hard-line conservatives who favored Khamenei.  To quell 
civil unrest following the 1996 elections, Khamenei issued a 
public statement that condemned Iran’s moderates and 
reformists, “The mirage of development risks alienating us 
from our fundamental values and driving us down the path to 
dependence … The general trend of parliament must conform to 
Islamic values.”146  This left Rafsanjani’s administration in 
the difficult position of trying to reconcile the demands of 
the revolution and the need for more effective economic 
reform and involvement with the international community.  
Rafsanjani seemed resigned to minimal effectiveness in 
the last years of his presidency, and was careful to balance 
pragmatic reforms with ideological demands.147  Among the 
unofficial reforms during this time was some relaxation of 
press, media, and social freedoms.148  Another phenomenon of 
Rafsanjani’s early reforms was the increasing numbers of 
students and educated young adults.  Initially a tactic to 
deal with the “youth bulge” mentioned previously, 
Rafsanjani’s educational reforms were creating a more 
modern, educated society.149  Subsequently, public debate 
flourished and a re-invigorated reform movement began to 
build prior to the 1997 presidential election. 
During the 1997 presidential elections, the Guardian 
Council again eliminated all candidates they deemed 
insufficiently Islamic or lacked revolutionary qualities.  
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From over 200 candidates, only four were allowed to run for 
office.150  The conservatives viewed this election as a 
formality in their transition to total leadership. Fearing 
public backlash if the reformist were denied a candidate on 
the final ballot, Mohammad Khatami was allowed to run by the 
Guardian Council because, although popular, he was not seen 
as a threat.151 
With Ayatollah Khamenei’s backing of the primary 
conservative candidate, the conservatives seemed confident 
of finally controlling both the elected and un-elected 
chambers of government.152  However, Rafsanjani and his 
pragmatic supporters opposed the idea of the conservatives 
with absolute power, and joined with the new reformist 
movement to back Mohammad Khatami.  Khatami’s landslide 
victory shocked the conservatives, and changed the dynamics 
between the state and society, politicians and constituents. 
The conservatives, who controlled virtually all the 
major institutions of power except the presidency and 
cabinet, moved quickly to rally around Ayatollah Khamenei 
and limit Khatami’s effectiveness.  Shortly after the 
elections, Khamenei announced Rafsanjani’s appointment to 
lead the Expediency Council (see diagram in chapter 2 for 
reference).153  This was likely a move by conservatives to 
limit his influence by placing him in a powerful position 
that requires neutrality.  This assumption is strengthened 
by the Expediency Council’s lack of support for any of 
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Khatami’s numerous reform-oriented efforts that were blocked 
or vetoed by the Guardian Council.154  Rafsanjani will re-
emerge as a prominent player in the hard-line conservatism 
years, but he is rarely mentioned for the remainder of the 
reformist period. 
Khatami’s first three years in office were met with 
stiff resistance from conservatives, and very few of his 
initiatives were passed.  Among them were considerably 
relaxed restrictions on the press and media, which further 
promoted the reformist agenda among the disillusioned 
voters.155  The Judiciary’s efforts to suppress discord via 
the press became a source for renewed public backlash 
leading up to the 2000 parliamentary elections.156 
In the wake of the 1999 student riots, violent 
suppression, and arrests by the Judiciary and forces loyal 
to the conservative clergy, the 2000 parliamentary elections 
saw very little candidate manipulation by the Guardian 
Council.157  Even Ayatollah Khamenei urged Khatami's critics 
to "avoid any behavior that may damage national unity."158 
As in the 1997 elections, the Iranian people sent a 
clear message in 2000 that they wanted change.  
Conservatives were overwhelming swept from parliament, 
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giving reformists 71 percent of the seats.159  For a brief 
time, it appeared as though the reformists had the momentum 
to finally challenge the state’s un-elected, conservative, 
clerical rule. 
Although reformists now controlled both the presidency 
and the parliament, the predominance of power still rested 
with the Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and 
Expediency Council -- all unelected conservatives whom the 
voting public cannot touch.  Khatami and the parliament 
passed several reform bills, but most were vetoed by the 
Council of Guardians or blocked outright by Ayatollah 
Khamenei.160  The conservatives were on the offensive to 
consolidate their power in the non-elected seats of power, 
and impede further reform measures. 
Following the events of 9/11, and Iran’s subsequent 
inclusion in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, 
conservatives took a hard-line stance against reform.161  As 
we saw through the civil society lens, the population, 
despite favoring improved dialogue with the U.S., did not 
strongly oppose the conservative protectionist measures.162  
Emboldened by reduced public opposition, the hardliners 
stepped up anti-reform activity through suppression of the 
press, media, and civil liberties. 
After years of marginally successful reform efforts, 
Khatami and other reformists made one last push to ensure 
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future reform.163  In late 2002, Khatami and the Parliament 
passed two bills aimed at strengthening the position of the 
President and limiting the Guardian Council’s power to veto 
legislation.164  As previously mentioned, Khatami was in a 
strong position to force the passage of bills by threatening 
to resign and de-legitimate the government at the height of 
public support for a national referendum.165  The 
conservative cleric-led judiciary reacted proactively and 
stepped up attacks on reform supporters.  A popular 
professor, Hashem Aghajari, was arrested and sentenced to 
death for comments supporting reform and freedom.  This 
sparked another round of violent student protests that 
forced Khatami to postpone efforts to push through his 
bills.166  By the time the social unrest settled down in 
early 2003, the pending U.S. invasion of Iraq further 
strengthened the conservatives by diverting attention from 
the reformists’ agenda.  Khatami and the reformists had lost 
their momentum, and the Guardian Council vetoed the bills 
with minimal protest.167 
Although Khatami had overwhelming support of the 
Iranian people, he never seemed willing to wield that power 
to directly confront the Supreme Leader or the ruling 
clerics.168  As such, the reform movement lost coherence and 
gave way to a more nationalistic approach.  As we will see 
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in the next chapter, the global environment after 9/11 
provided Iran’s hard-line conservatives with ammunition to 
stage a “parliamentary coup” with considerable support from 
the Guardian Council.169  The reformist period ended with the 
2004 parliamentary elections, and left Khatami in a position 
of total ineffectiveness until his term ended in 2005. 
D. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The International Politics lens suggests that external 
factors drive Iran’s domestic politics.  If true, then we 
should see the Iranian government reacting to specific 
changes in the in the regional and international arena.  
As highlighted several times, Iran faced an internal 
economic crisis in the late 1980s due to international 
sanctions and the Iran-Iraq war.  However, with the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, and rise of a prominent, economics-savvy 
president, Rafsanjani, international interest over Iran 
increased.  Iran emerged from the war with little 
international debt, and Rafsanjani sought to reform Iran’s 
economy with the help of international investment and 
trade.170    
The U.S. has imposed numerous sanctions and trade 
limitations on Iran since the 1979 revolution.171  However, 
many countries, notably Russia, France, Germany, and Japan, 
viewed U.S. sanctions more as a manifestation of U.S.-
Iranian differences, and did not regard Iran with such 
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contempt.  To the contrary, many such states feared that 
U.S. policy would more likely drive Iran toward extremism 
and violence.172  These countries saw trade and dialogue with 
Iran as moderating and productive.  Entering the reformist 
period, these countries became significant trade partners 
with Iran.173  
Initially, Rafsanjani’s economic reforms and trade 
initiatives benefited Iran’s internal situation, and 
strengthened Rafsanjani’s political standing.  Iran also 
benefited from a sharp rise in oil prices following the 1991 
Gulf War which gave it almost $20 billion in oil income.174  
Improved international relations contributed to Rafsanjani’s 
domestic-political clout, and helped him purge radicals and 
hardliners from government and state bureaucracy, 
particularly in the 1992 parliamentary elections. 
Interestingly, although Ayatollah Khamenei benefited 
politically from improved international relations, he 
limited his involvement in international politics while 
maintaining strong revolutionary, anti-west rhetoric.175  
This left Rafsanjani’s administration in the difficult 
position of trying to reconcile the demands of the 
revolution and the need for economic involvement with the 
international community.  As a result, Rafsanjani was unable 
to engage in a consistent foreign policy or to function as 
the primary international interface.176   
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Amid growing tensions in the Levant (Israel/Palestine, 
Lebanon, and Syria) in 1995, the U.S. imposed a total 
embargo which prohibited U.S. companies from doing business 
with Iran.  In 1996 the U.S. imposed “The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act”, an anti-terror action that imposed greater 
trade sanctions on Iran and included penalties for other 
countries dealing with Iran.177  These two U.S. measures 
significantly weakened Iran’s economy, and hindered its 
ability to repay its growing international debt, which 
Rafsanjani was using to finance economic recovery.  At the 
same time, Iran’s inflation soared to around 40 percent.178   
As a result of these developments with international 
actors, Rafsanjani’s domestic support declined amid 
accusations of corruption and marginalization by the 
conservative clergy.179  At the same time, Khamenei 
solidified his position as Supreme Leader, and exerted his 
influence to limit Rafsanjani’s more aggressive reform 
efforts.180  A conservative backlash during the 1996 
parliamentary elections led to the ousting of many 
reformists and allies of Rafsanjani, giving parliament back 
to the traditional conservatives. 
U.S. sanctions in the 1990s appear to have had an 
effect on Iranian public debate regarding their relation 
with the international community.181  This and other themes 
resonated with the new reformist movement prior to the 1997 
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presidential elections.  Therefore, at least partially, 
relations (or lack of) with the international community 
contributed to a significant shift in Iranian politics.   
The majority of the international community viewed the 
surprisingly solid victory of President Khatami in a very 
positive light.182  President Clinton’s veto of greater 
sanctions in 1998 signaled a “wait and see” posture, and a 
Clinton-Khatami meeting in 2000 signaled cautious, but tacit 
support for Khatami’s new administration.183  With the 
possibility of entering a new era of international 
relevance, internal debate and optimism surfaced again in 
Iran’s 2000 parliamentary elections, which placed Khatami 
and the reformists firmly in control of the executive and 
parliamentary branches of government. 
Although Khatami was limited internally by the 
conservatives, his reformist stance made him more popular on 
the international stage than any of his predecessors since 
the revolution.184  In late 2000, Khatami began pursuing an 
agenda dubbed “Dialog Among Civilizations”, aimed at 
improving relations on the international stage.185  The 
United Nations accepted Khatami’s proposal to declare 2001 
the “Year of Dialog among Civilizations”.186  Khatami hoped 
to address socio-cultural debate both in Iran and the West, 
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and reconcile the root ideals in Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations”.187  Iranian conservatives had long used the 
premise of a civilization clash to promote religious ideals, 
curtail individual freedoms, and stifle debate on improved 
relations with the West.188  Leading into 2001, it appeared 
as though Khatami would be able to combine successes on both 
the domestic and international stages, and ride the momentum 
toward greater reform and democracy in Iran.  He easily won 
reelection in early 2001, but the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 
and subsequent international turmoil would soon derail his 
efforts. 
The Iranian government officially condemned the 9/11 
attacks, and Khatami was quick to offer support in seeking 
those responsible.189  However, in keeping with his agenda of 
improving international relations, Khatami urged restraint 
and pursuit of justice through the international courts.190  
Iran also pledged $560 million for Afghan reconstruction, 
which was the largest amount of any third world country.191  
Despite Iran’s overtures of cooperation, President Bush’s 
inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil” speech was a 
devastating blow to Khatami and the reformist movement. 
Following the “Axis of Evil” declaration, Iran’s 
conservatives mounted a swift campaign to de-legitimize the 
reform movement and close the remaining reformist bases of 
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support.192  Conservative factions moved to close the 
remaining reform presses, arrest leading reform leaders, and 
disqualify reform candidates from running for office.193 
Khatami immediately became a lame-duck president, and the 
reform movement was almost completely sidelined. 
E. ANALYSIS 
After examining the reformist years through our three 
analytical lenses, it is clear that no one lens drove 
Iranian politics in the reformist years.  This was a period 
of development and self discovery for Iran, and all three of 
the areas that the lenses illuminate had significant effect.  
Many of the recognizable shifts in the government’s agenda 
were the result of all three lenses, but the individual 
analysis of each lens offers a more holistic understanding 
of how and why these shifts occurred. 
This period encompasses the terms of two Iranian 
presidents.  Each had a different agenda (the first economic 
reform and second social reform) but there are striking 
similarities in the development of their policies and 
progression of the political environment during their 
respective time in office.  At the time presidents 
Rafsanjani and Khatami took office, they did so with a 
conservative-dominated Parliament that was fundamentally 
opposed to their agendas.  Rafsanjani and Khatami then  
relied on Iran’s domestic and international circumstances to 
enlist the voting public’s support in the subsequent 
parliamentary election cycles.  The resulting parliamentary 
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makeup tended to be more reform oriented and in line with 
the current President’s agenda.  Rafsnajani and Khatami were 
both reelected, amid conservative backlash and political 
scheming.  After the president’s reelection, the Guardian 
Council would vet the “right” candidates for the following 
parliamentary elections, and the president would lose the 
parliament’s support for the remainder of his time in 
office.  As a result of this process, each president entered 
office as a “lame duck” and left office as a “lame duck”, 
while Parliament alternated between conservative and 
reformist domination.  Although this trend, as illustrated 
in the bullets below, does not continue into the hard-line 
conservatism years, it is nonetheless, interesting: 
- 1989: New president (opposing parliament) 
- 1992: Voters change parliament to support President 
- 1993: President wins reelection 
- 1996: Guardian Council skews parliament candidates 
toward conservatives (Supreme Leader)  
- 1997: New President (opposing parliament)  
- 2000: Voters change parliament to support President 
- 2001: President wins reelection 
- 2004: Guardian Council skews parliament candidates 
toward conservatives (Supreme Leader) 
This trend does indicate the underlying tug-of-war  
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between the democratic aspirations of the people, and the 
conservative ideological fundamentalism of Iran’s unique 
theocratic system. 
 By relaxing governmental control over newspapers, 
arts, and cinema, the Khatami years brought increased, 
productive intellectual and political discourse in Iran that 
rapidly reshaped the style and content of Iranian 
politics.194  This fact was not lost on the conservatives who 
adjusted their political agenda and rhetoric to appease 
greater public involvement with politics.  This new approach 
by hard-line conservatives to sell their brand of government 
(more development, but less liberty) was on key with public 
needs, and national fundamentalist agendas. 
In many ways, the Khatami period, in spite of all 
efforts to advocate and exercise democracy, was marked by 
conservative consolidation of power.  During the Khatami 
years, Iranian society was more engaged in debates on 
democracy than at any other time in the country’s history, 
but the quest for democracy was eclipsed by the fact that 
power remained in the hands of an increasingly authoritarian 
clerical leadership that streamlined its hold over 
organizational and decision-making apparatuses exactly at 
the time when the Iranian society showed greater signs of 
moving toward democracy.195 
Ultimately, it was a merger of all three lenses in the 
wake of the 2002 “Axis of Evil” declaration that brought an 
end to the reformist period.  Conservatives used this event 
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to clamp down on civil society, reassert their control of 
the government and bureaucracy, and take a hard-line, 
confrontational stance with international relations.  
Finally, our analysis of the reformist years calls to 
mind the Greek mythological character Sisyphus, constantly 
struggling with the forces of gravity to push his rock up 
the hill.  Both Rafsanjani and Khatami brought significant, 
positive progress to Iran, and instilled reforms that won’t 
quickly erode.  When it seemed that Khatami had a chance to 




VI. HARD-LINE CONSERVATIVE YEARS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Hard-line Conservatism Years (2004-present) began 
with a conservative “parliamentary coup” in 2004.196  In 
stark contrast to the 2000 parliamentary elections, the 
reformist suffered a dramatic reversal of fortune as they 
were almost entirely swept out of parliament.  Following 
their defeat in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the 
conservatives embarked on a consolidation process designed 
to regain control of the elected seats in government.  
President Bush’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech and the western 
Global War on Terror significantly aided this process.  The 
2004 elections saw heavy involvement of the Guardian Council 
to disqualify nearly all their reformist candidates 
including numerous incumbents.197  The resulting 
conservative-led Parliament left President Khatami and the 
reform movement in a significantly weakened political 
position.   
In the lead up to the 2005 presidential elections, the 
conservatives were able to assert an alternate vision of 
reform that was less concerned with culture and politics, 
and more concerned with state building and development.198  
These ideals resonated with the lower class, which provided 
hardliners and Ahmadinejad with a winning campaign platform  
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that helped conservatives to reign in public debate for 
greater democracy in exchange for better government and 
development.   
The 2005 presidential campaign saw numerous interesting 
developments and fracture amongst Iranian conservatives.  
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad signified the complete 
takeover by hard-line conservative backed by Ayatollah 
Khamenei.  The actions and rhetoric of the new hard-line 
government almost immediately reversed the trend of 
improving international relations, as seen in the reformist 
period, creating a significant backlash from the 
international community.    
 This chapter examines the Hard-Line Conservatism 
period using our three analytical lenses: civil society, 
bureaucratic politics, and international relations, with the 
goal of better understanding the factors that drove Iranian 
politics during this period.  Thus far during this period, 
we see a single lens providing the primary impetus for 
change.  As in the Khomeini years, the drivers for change 
originate primarily within the bureaucratic politic lens.  
B. CIVIL SOCIETY 
The civil society lens suggests that the people, when 
sufficiently motivated and mobilized, can place pressure on 
the government to address a perceived or real grievance.  In 
turn, the government must, to some extent, be sensitive to 
the will of the people and react in some manner to either 
suppress or appease them.  Using this lens we can focus on 
the society-government relationship to investigate the 
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extent to which civil society drove changes within the 
Iranian government during the hardliner period. 
Leading into the hard-line conservatism period, the 
social sector was significantly restricted due to the 
conservative crackdowns discussed in the previous chapter.  
Iran’s population had witnessed the inability of the 
reformists to make significant changes in the government’s 
power structure, especially in the non-elected positions 
where conservatives had a strangle-hold on the government’s 
ultimate authority and decision making.199  Additionally the 
“Axis of Evil” declaration, and U.S. invasion of Iraq, 
provided the conservative judiciary and security forces with 
an excuse to clamp down on the press, arrest key reform 
figures, and roll back some of the civil liberties the 
reformists had championed.200  Ayatollah Khamenei and the 
conservatives insisted they were not suppressing democratic 
rights, but rather were instituting security measures to 
safeguard Iran from foreign intervention.201  
Consequentially, much of the reformist agenda was left 
unaccomplished in the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary 
elections.   
Since their ousting in 2000, conservatives had engaged 
in efforts to regain control of the executive and 
legislative branches of government.202  Throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s, Iranians had become more active in politics 
and selection of their elected officials.  Conservatives 
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realized the need to adapt their approaches and to address 
social demands.  This led to what Gheissari and Nasr call 
“pragmatic authoritarianism” that sought to redefine the 
relationship between the state and society.203  While 
claiming crackdowns on civil liberties were in the best 
interest of national unity, conservatives sought to sell the 
idea of stronger government and more economic development in 
exchange for less emphasis on social and democratic 
reform.204   
A new faction of hard-line conservatives (many of whom 
have strong ties to Iran’s military and security apparatus) 
began to emerge as an alternative to the reformers’ 
unfulfilled promises of economic, democratic, and social 
reform and used state-building and development as their 
platform.205  This message began to gain traction with rural 
and lower class Iranians who had not significantly benefited 
from reformist efforts.   
The municipal (local) elections in early 2003, gave 
hard-line conservatives confirmation that voters could be 
swayed by promises of stronger and more-efficient 
government, development, and better social services.206  In 
local elections, hard-line conservatives routed reformist 
candidates.207  This sent a clear message that Iranians on 
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the street cared more about local issues than overarching 
governmental and social reform.208  The 2003 elections also 
helped solidify the new hard-line conservative platform 
which placed emphasis on development and re-distribution of 
resources as the new vision of reform.209  Of note, one of 
the races in the 2003 municipal elections was for Tehran’s 
mayor.  A relatively unknown politician and hardliner, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, won the election and became widely 
popular with his hard-line rhetoric and appeal to the lower 
classes.210 
During the 2004 parliamentary elections, most of the 
reformist candidates were disqualified, including 80 
incumbent members.211  Many Iranians, disillusioned with the 
reform process, boycotted the elections in hopes that a low 
voter turnout would deprive the conservatives of a 
legitimate victory.212  In stark contrast to the 2000 
elections which saw roughly 80 percent participation, only 
51 percent of registered voters participated in the 2004 
elections.213  The combination of sweeping 
disqualifications, and low voter turnout (boycotters were 
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mostly middle-class supporters of the reform movement) 
resulted in a near-complete takeover of Parliament by 
conservatives, mostly hardliners.214  Although Iran’s 
leading reformist, President Khatami, was still in office, 
the period of hard-line conservatism had officially begun. 
In the aftermath of the 2004 parliamentary elections, 
and leading into the 2005 presidential elections, Iran’s 
hardliners embarked on efforts to bolster Iranian 
nationalism and establish legitimacy for their hard-line 
stance.215  Ayatollah Khamenei, emphasizing the need to 
return to revolutionary values, publically announced that 
Iran was not “prepared to allow flawed and non-divine 
perspectives and ideas that are aimed at enhancing the power 
of the individual to dictate its social and political 
lives.”216 
In preparation for the 2005 presidential elections the 
Guardian Council eliminated over 1,000 applicants, including 
all reformists.217  To alleviate the potential for public 
backlash, Khamenei intervened to allow two reformist 
candidates to run.218  However, from the beginning, it was 
clear to most observers and Iranian citizens that the only 
real competition would be between mainline and hard-line 
conservatives.219   
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With Khamenei’s backing, the new hard-line conservative 
faction ratcheted up rhetoric that promised to achieve the 
goals of the revolution through a strong, unified 
government.220  They appealed to Iranians nationalism and 
pointed to the reformists’ failure at effective reform.    
Leading into the 2005 presidential elections, Iran’s 
conservatives became fragmented with moderates, 
traditionalists, and pragmatists looking for a conservative 
candidate who could offset the hardliners.221  Many saw 
former president Rafsanjani as the only leader who could 
strengthen the presidency and challenge the new 
hardliners.222 
Ahmadinejad rarely mentioned religion during his 
campaign; instead he appealed to populist themes of 
decreasing corruption and improving the lives of poor and 
working-class Iranians.223  He built strong support from the 
lower class, disenfranchised population that Rafsanjani 
could not reach.  One of Ahmadinejad’s main slogans became 
“Bring the oil money to the people’s table”, which appealed 
to the working-class and urban poor.224  This was a break 
with political trends in the reformist period, which placed 
more focus on the middle class.225 
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Rafsanjani, on the other hand, adopted a pragmatic 
approach and focused on the middle class. He also increased 
his calls for greater socioeconomic and sociopolitical  
reform.226  Rafsanjani’s support base came from the upper 
and middle classes, but those were divided between reformist 
and conservative views.227   
In the primary elections, Rafsanjani won the most votes 
(21.2 percent), but Ahmadinejad obtained enough votes (19.2 
percent) to force a runoff.228  During the runoff, 
Ahmadinejad portrayed himself as a “man of the people”.  He 
promised to fight corruption and political elitism, as well 
as redistribute wealth to the poor.229   Rafsanjani, though 
popular and powerful, represented the political elite that 
Ahmadinejad postured his campaign against.   
Although most reformist leaders backed Rafsanjani, many 
who supported the reformists boycotted the second round of 
voting, while others were swayed by Ahmadinejad’s populist 
appeal.230  Ahmadinejad won the second round of elections 
with 62 percent of the vote.231   
With hardliners in control of the presidency and 
parliament, and the perception of reduced friction between 
hard-line conservatives in elected seats and cleric 
conservatives in the non-elected seats, the Iranian 
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government could no longer cite gridlock for failure to meet 
its responsibilities to the people.232  Unfortunately, the 
hardliners’ promises of development and improved standards 
of living have not materialize, and repression of the press, 
media, and civil liberties increased after Ahmadinejad 
became president.233 
After taking office, Ahmadinejad and the hardliners 
took authoritative measures to isolate Iranian society from 
outside influence.234  In 2007, the government issued stern 
warnings to Iran’s news media against discussing prohibited 
topics: inflation, economic troubles, international 
sanctions, civil society movements, and mass arrests of 
dissidents.235  Ahmadinejad sought to undermine his 
reformist and moderate opponents by diminishing their social 
and political positions within the middle and upper classes, 
while consolidating his own position.236 
The 2008 parliamentary elections saw another round of 
mass disqualifications by the Guardian Council.  Most of the 
nearly 2000 disqualified candidates were reformists and 
moderate conservatives, including Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
grandson, Ali Khomeini, who the Council later reinstated 
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after a public outcry.237  Reformists and moderates again 
threatened boycotts, but leaders like former presidents 
Khatami and Rafsanjani, urged participation in the hopes of 
preventing a repeat of the 2004 elections and avoiding 
another complete hard-line domination of the elections.238  
Nonetheless, only 60 percent of Iranian voters participated 
in the 2008 elections.  Comparatively speaking, this is an 
extremely voter low turnout when compared to the late 90s 
and early 2000s.239   
Unlike the previous reformist period, Iranian society 
has reduced its political activism and pressure thus far in 
the hard-line period.  This decrease has been, in large 
part, due to hard-line crackdowns, and disenfranchisement 
over reform failures.  Despite the muted social impetus for 
change, Iranian society is still a significant player on the 
political scene in terms of voter participation and 
communicating social concerns during Iran’s elections.  In 
correlation with the international relations lens (discussed 
later in this chapter), we see Iranian nationalism rising in 
response to external pressure.  This correlation between 
external pressure and internal social reaction, serves to 
strengthen Iran’s hardliners when pressure is high and 
weakens them when pressure is low. 
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With the next round of presidential elections in 2009, 
it will be interesting to see if political activism in the 
social arena will regain its former rigor and impetus for 
governmental change.  
C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model describes how 
individuals (even in very authoritarian states) do not 
necessarily determine the behaviors or actions of 
government.  Rather individual actors — their roles, 
interactions, the situation, and the rules of the government 
– has a compounding effect that becomes the government’s 
behavior.  Therefore, when using the bureaucratic politics 
lens, it is important to focus more on the players in the 
government and their interactions, and less on specific 
motivating themes.  This section will therefore focus on the 
main players during this period; the Ayatollah Khamenei 
(Supreme Leader), President Rafsanjani (1989-1997), 
President Khatami (1997-2005), Parliament, The Guardian 
Council, and the Judiciary. 
The reformists were somewhat successful in pursuing 
socioeconomic reform, but they failed to make significant 
changes in the government’s power structure, -- especially 
in the non-elected positions where the government’s ultimate 
authority resides.240  Conservative defeats during the 
reformist period caused significant recoil within the 
conservative establishment.  Although conservative clerics 
maintained the top seats of power in the non-elected 
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positions, the conservative elite engaged in efforts to re-
establish conservative control of the executive and 
legislative branches of government.241  Conservatives used 
the U.S.’ “Axis of Evil” declaration as an excuse to 
discredit Khatami for his overtures to the West, and as a 
rallying call for nationalism to divert attention away from 
reform and reconnect with the Iranian population.   
Many conservatives recognized the need to increase 
their public legitimacy in the context of domestic issues, 
but there was little consensus on which direction to 
take.242   During the reformist period, conservatives tended 
to side with each other against the reformists.  With the 
reformists in disarray, differences between the conservative 
elite became apparent on matters of policy.243  Where the 
reformists looked to the West for socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical models, Iran's hard-line conservatives looked 
to the East for their version of reform.244  Hardliners 
viewed the “China Model” as a compromise to address social 
needs (not liberties) without loosening their strangle-hold 
on power.245  Not all conservatives shared this view.  
Traditional conservatives (pragmatics and moderates) 
preferred the democratic process over the hard-liners’ 
inflexibility.246  Consequentially, the conservative 
establishment fractured leading up to the 2004 parliamentary 
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elections.247  Hardliners aligned themselves with a new 
political party called Abadgaran (Development Party), 
sponsored by Ayatollah Khamenei. 
During the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Guardian 
Council disqualified most of the reformist candidates, 
including 80 incumbent members.248  In a clear indication of 
partisan maneuvering, Ayatollah Khamenei reportedly 
presented the Guardian Council with a list of “acceptable” 
candidates that was given to him in a dream.249  These 
actions by Khamenei and the Guardian Council were 
unprecedented when compared to past election tampering.250  
Despite president Khatami’s objections and efforts to 
overturn some of the disqualifications, the reformists were 
almost completely shut out of the elections.251  In protest 
to the excessive election tampering, many moderate and 
pragmatic conservatives withdrew their candidacies.252  The 
combination of sweeping disqualifications, withdrawals, and 
low voter turnout, resulted in a near-complete takeover of 
Parliament by the hard-line conservatives.253  With one year 
left in office, President Khatami was left in a lame-duck 
position with hardliners and conservative clerics firmly in 
control. 
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In the aftermath of the 2004 parliamentary elections, 
the hardliners embarked on efforts to legitimize their hard-
line stance in preparation for the 2005 presidential 
elections.254  Fractures in the conservative establishment 
began to widen significantly as many mainline conservatives  
openly questioned the hard-line motives, and were unhappy 
with the 2004 elections because it decreased their influence 
in government.255 
As in the previous elections, the Guardian Council 
selectively vetted the field of candidates in the 2005 
presidential elections.  This time the Council eliminated 
over 1,000 applicants, including all reformists.256  To 
alleviate the potential for public backlash, Khamenei 
intervened to allow two reformist candidates to run.257   
With Khamenei’s backing of hard-line presidential 
candidate, Ahmadinejad, the new hard-line conservative 
faction ratcheted up pressure on reformists and other 
conservatives.258  The hard-liners’ rhetoric alarmed many 
moderate, pragmatic, and traditional conservatives, who saw 
Khamenei’s support of the hardliners as a drive to 
consolidate his own power.259  Some of the conservative 
elites argued that a total hard-line takeover would 
dismember the Iranian Government.260 
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Leading into the 2005 presidential elections, Iran’s 
moderate and pragmatic conservatives began looking for a 
conservative candidate who could offset the hardliners.261   
Many saw former president Rafsanjani as the only leader who 
could strengthen the presidency and limit Khamenei’s 
consolidation of power.262 
The 2005 presidential elections were the most closely 
contested since the revolution, resulting in a run-off 
between Rafsanjaini and Ahmadinejad.263  In the runoff, 
reformists and moderate conservatives, fearing a total hard-
line takeover, backed Rafsanjani in the second round.  They 
saw an Ahmadinejad victory as a return to the militancy of 
the revolution’s early years.264  Despite strong reformist 
and conservative support for Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad’s 
populist appeal (and probable tampering and intimidation by 
hard-line clerics and security forces) garnered a greater 
percentage of the vote by a margin of 62 percent to 35 
percent.265 
After taking office, Ahmadinejad and the hardliners 
engaged in significant suppression and harassment of their 
political opposition.266  Hardliners began replacing many 
traditional conservatives and old-guard clerics throughout 
the bureaucracy.267  With Khamenei’s apparent approval, the 
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hardliners also openly attacked senior conservative clerics 
and chastised them for supporting Rafsanjani.268 
Despite the hard-line drive to consolidate power, 
Rafsanjani became a member of the Assembly of Experts 
following his loss in the 2005 elections.269  In late 2007, 
Rafsanjani became chairman of the Assembly.  This ironic 
twist elevated him to a position of influence that could 
potentially reshape Iran’s government and ideology if and 
when Khamenei’s successor is chosen.270 
The 2008 parliamentary elections saw another round of 
mass disqualifications by the Guardian Council.  Most of the 
approximately 2000 disqualified candidates were reformists 
and moderate conservatives.271  Reformists and moderates 
again threatened boycotts and withdrawals, but former 
presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani urged participation in the 
hopes of preventing a repeat of the 2004 elections.272  
Although many of the “approved” reform and moderate 
candidates won their races, hardliners maintained the 
predominance of seats and control of parliament.273 
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Political and bureaucratic wrangling continues in the 
lead up to the 2009 presidential elections, in which 
Ahmadinejad faces growing discontent from the Supreme 
Leader, fellow hardliners and the other “Old Guard” 
conservatives alike.274  Many moderates and reformists are 
encouraging former President Khatami to run against 
Ahmadinejad, as they feel he is the only potential candidate 
with enough appeal to wrest the presidency from the 
hardliners.275 
D. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The international lens focuses on the dynamic between 
the state and international system.  The actions and 
behaviors of the international community affect the actions 
and behavior of the state and vice versa.  We will use this 
lens to determine how external influences shape the behavior 
and actions of Iran. 
The hard-line conservative years opened with the 2004 
hardliner takeover of parliament and Iran’s quest for 
nuclear power development, at the forefront of international 
thought.  Although Iran has asserted that its nuclear 
pursuits are purely peaceful, the international community 
believes otherwise.  Since the startling discovery of Iran’s 
secret nuclear development program in 2002, the 
international community has questioned Iran’s true motives 
                     
274  Siamdoust. 
275  Najmeh Bozorgmehrin, “Khatami Ponders 2009 Poll” Financial 
Times,http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto092120070514164
485(accessed on November 25, 2008). 
 90
and intentions.276  A nuclear armed Iran raises two critical 
questions: could and would Iran act responsibly with nuclear 
arms, and would Iran provide nuclear weapons to terrorists? 
Iran’s sponsorship of known terrorist organizations, 
such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, dates back to the Khomeini era 
and his attempt to export the revolution.  However, during 
Hard-line Conservative, contrary to the previous two, 
dissuading Iran’s support of known terrorist organization 
has become the principal focus of the international 
community.  According to the Council of Foreign Relations, 
Iran has been the “central banker” for many terrorist 
organizations that reside in key regions of the world, 
(Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq), providing them with an array 
of assets ranging from funding, weapons, training, and 
sanctuary.277  In August 2008, the U.S. House of 
Representatives took measures to add Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard corps to the list of foreign terrorist 
organizations, citing “overwhelming evidence” that connected 
Iran with terrorist support in both Iraq and Afghanistan.278  
In a show of defiance and disregard for international 
pressure, the Iranian Parliament in turn, labeled both the 
U.S. Army and Central Intelligence Agency as terrorist  
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organizations.279  Iran’s affiliation with terrorist 
organization keeps them in the spotlight and isolated from 
the international community. 
In 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol Agreement, 
which called for more intrusive inspections of its nuclear 
facilities.280  In 2004, the new hardliner-dominated 
parliament disagreed with the terms and conditions set forth 
in the agreement, which was originally signed by their 
reformist predecessors.  In accordance with their 
nationalistic stance, the hardliners refused to ratify the 
agreement under its original terms.281  Iranian officials 
questioned the agreements fairness, as several regional 
neighbors too had acquired nuclear weaponry without the same 
international scrutiny.282  As such, the hard-liners loosely 
abided by the agreement and labeled the nuclear dispute as 
another U.S. ploy to overthrow the republic.283   
In July 2006, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 
1696, which required Iran to stop “all its enrichment 
related and reprocessing activities.”284  Iran’s lack of 
compliance resulted in another round of UN sanctions in 
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2007, restricting trade of Iranian weaponry and banking.285  
Despite UN resolutions and sanctions, Iran continues to 
forage nuclear development.  The belief that any U.S.-Iran 
compromise would delegitimize the revolution fueled the 
Iranian government’s quest for nuclear capabilities and to 
assert Iran’s national rights on the international stage.286 
The 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
created an air of uncertainty in the international arena.  
Iran’s new president boldly engaged in anti-American and 
anti-Israeli rhetoric.  He took a more radical hard-line 
stance on Iranian foreign policy and sought to increase, 
rather than decrease international tensions.287  Past 
international leverage used against Iran proved to be futile 
and ineffective against the current hard-line regime, 
sanctions and embargos have yielded no tangible results. The 
unwillingness of the both the international community, to 
include Russia288 and China289 who have in the past been 
supporter of Iran quest for nuclear technology, and Iran to 
agree on nuclear development policies and rights, has 
created an international stalemate with no simple resolution 
in sight.  The past has repeatedly demonstrated that  
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external pressure on Iran primarily serves to strengthen 
Iranian nationalism and general support for the ruling 
regime.   
The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stated 
“with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its 
nuclear weapons program” which in-turn temporarily decreased 
international pressure, allowing the Iranian government to 
shift its focus from the international stage to the 
country’s domestic issues.290  Without an external threat to 
invoke a sense of Iranian nationalism and solidarity, the 
society began to pressure the government to address and 
fulfill its promises of economic development and 
redistribution of wealth.291   
Within this timeframe, Iranian Quds forces harassed a 
U.S. Navy ship in the straits of Hormouz.  This reignited 
tensions within the international community over Iranian 
intentions..292  As a result the Iranian populace shifted 
its gaze back to international stage and away from domestic 
issues.   
E. ANALYSIS 
The hard-line conservative period is ongoing; 
therefore, a conclusive analysis cannot yet be performed.  
However, the three lenses reveal a significant change from 
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the reformist period.  The primary impetus for change thus 
far during this period originates from events and 
interactions observed in the bureaucratic lens.  Conversely, 
we saw significant marginalization of societal influence 
over government in the social lens, and a decrease in the 
government’s sensitivity to pressures from the international 
arena.  Unfortunately this thesis concludes just as 
political gamesmanship is beginning in the lead up to Iran’s 
2009 presidential elections.  With Ahmadinejad losing some 
support from Khamenei and elements of the hard-line 
establishment, it will be interesting to see how the 
elections unfold, as reformist and pragmatic conservatives 
unite to regain public support, and old guard conservatives 
assert their influence with the guardian council to mitigate 







The goal of this thesis was to gain a better 
understanding of the factors that have facilitated change 
within the Iranian policies over the last 30 years.  To do 
so, we constructed analytical lenses that allowed us to 
isolate, and analyze individually, three primary sources of 
influence to which changes in policy change can be 
attributed; civil society, bureaucratic politics, and 
international politics.  We then applied our lenses to three 
time periods in which Iran’s government experienced 
observable shifts in behavior and ideology the Khomeini 
years, the reformist years, and the hard-line conservative 
years.  Our process of dissecting Iran’s modern history into 
three periods, separated by distinct policy shifts, and then 
dissecting those three periods into three focal points, gave 
us a perspective with which to analyze Iran’s behavioral 
changes.  The individual analysis of each lens offers a more 
holistic understanding of how and why shifts occurred in 
Iran’s politics. 
Our analysis reveals that the driving causes for change 
in Iran’s government are different during each of the three 
time periods.       
Khomeini Years:  When examining the Khomeini years, we 
saw a period defined by revolution, international crisis, 
war, and efforts to construct an Islamic government.  The 
events of this period took the country through socioeconomic 
repression, poverty, and isolation.  During this period, the 
civil society lens revealed that society was the initial 
impetus of change.  However, the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, 
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and growing differences between the various revolutionary 
factions, significantly marginalized society’s ability to 
affect governmental change.  The bureaucratic lens 
illustrated how Khomeini and his supporters capitalized on 
the war distractions and the fragmented revolutionary 
movement, by instituting Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic 
theocracy.  Through the international lens, external 
pressures associated with the hostage crisis and the war 
with Iraq increased internal solidarity and rallied support 
for Khomeini’s radical ideology and fundamentalist approach 
to state-building.  Although the international arena was not 
the primary impetus for political change it was certainly a 
significant enabler for the clerically led state building 
process.   
Ultimately throughout the Khomeini period, the 
preponderance political change was linked to Khomeini’s 
relationship with the Iranian people and his influence over 
Iran’s government.  
Reformist Years:  This was a period of development and 
self discovery for Iran, whereby all three lenses revealed 
significant influence on government behavior: society’s 
desire for greater civil liberties and quality of life, 
Presidents Rafsanjani’s and Khatami’s pursuit of 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical reforms, and the ebb and 
flow of international pressure.  After examining this period 
through our three analytical lenses, it became clear Iranian 
politics during the reformist years were driven by the 
conjoined influences of all three lenses. One very 
interesting revelation from this period was the underlying  
 97
tug-of-war between the democratic aspirations of the people, 
and the conservative ideological fundamentalism of Iran’s 
cleric-led theocratic system. 
Ironically, it was a merger of all three lenses in the 
wake of the 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech that brought an end 
to the reformist period.  Conservatives used this event to 
clamp down on civil society, reassert their control of the 
government and bureaucracy, and take a hard-line, 
confrontational stance with international relations.  
Hard-Line Conservative Years:  Analysis of this period 
reveals a considerably different political game.  In stark 
contrast to the reformist years, this period saw an almost 
complete domination by the political bureaucracy over the 
civil and international arenas.  The primary impetus for 
change, has originated almost entirely from the government 
itself.  Thus far, this period has seen significant 
marginalization of societal influence over government in the 
civic society lens, and a decrease in the government’s 
sensitivity to pressures from the international arena.   
As stated in the previous chapter, the timing of this 
thesis does not allow for a conclusive analysis of this 
period.  However, Iran’s upcoming 2009 elections and a 
change in the U.S. presidential administration, create the 
potential for change in the dynamics affecting all three of 
our analytical lenses.  
 When it comes to opportunities to influence Iran’s 
politics, the use of international pressure often has little 
effect at best, or the opposite effect at worst.  
Conversely, less international pressure tends to facilitate 
change from civil society and Iran’s more moderate 
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politicians.  Since the 1979 revolution, international 
pressure has not been the primary catalyst for change.  
Instead, Iranians’ strong sense of nationalism and their 
skepticism of the west create the conditions whereby true 
political change is primarily driven by the domestic social 
and bureaucratic arenas.  Accordingly, our analysis revealed 
that positive change in Iranian politics occurred during 
periods of significantly reduced external pressure.  
Therefore our findings suggest that effective U.S. policy 
toward Iran should not include rhetoric of regime change or 
overtures of external meddling.  Instead, a reduction in 
external pressure fosters positive change, thereby allowing 
Iranians’ themselves to change Iran. 
 Although our thesis focused on Iran, the framework 
created in chapter three is useful for analyzing other 
countries to better understand effective U.S. foreign 
policy.  Too often, it appears foreign policy is developed 
based upon an incomplete analysis, using the focal point of 
a single lens.  All three lenses together provide a more 
comprehensive approach to understanding how governments 
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